
Prepared for Imbewu Project
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Acronyms

ANC: African National Congress
CEPPAWU: Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers' Union
COSATU: Congress of South African Trade Unions
Cimec: Centre for Investment and Marketing in the Eastern Cape
DfID: Department for International Development Southern Africa
DOE: Department of Education
DPS: Deputy Permanent Secretary
ECDC: Eastern Cape Development Corporation
Ecsecc: Eastern Cape Socio-Economic Consultative Council
EDOs: Education Development Offices
EL: East London
EPU: Education Policy Unit
FHIG: Fort Hare Institute of Government
FMS: Financial Management System
GAAP: Generally Accepted Accounting Practice
GEAR: Growth Employment And Redistribution Strategy
GTZ: Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HODs: Heads of Departments
HRD: Human Resource Development
HSRC: Human Sciences Research Council
MEC: Member of Executive Council
MPL: Member of Parliament
NECC: National Education Crisis Committee
Nehawu: National Education Health and Workers Union
NGOs: Nongovernmental Organisations
PS: Permanent Secretary
RD: Regional Director
RDP: Reconstruction and Development Programme
SADTU: South African Democratic Teachers Union
VSP: Voluntary Severance Package
Wits: University of the Witwatersrand
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Introduction

This report describes and analyses base-line conditions in the Department of Education from 1994-1997. The report focuses on eight focus areas – policy and policy implementation, planning, organisation and establishment structure, human resource development, finance, organisational culture, curriculum and teacher development. The aim of the study is to provide the Imbewu project with a clear picture of prevailing conditions in the department before Imbewu started. The study reconstructs and restores the institutional memory of the department, and provides detailed base-line information and indicators against which the restructuring and transformation of the department can be assessed.

2. Policy and policy implementation

The policies that shaped the provincial department of education in the Eastern Cape prior to the inception of the Imbewu project reflected the national transformation of the content of education and the provincialisation of the implementation of educational delivery. Given the history of apartheid education, educational policies addressed the spatial and racial equalisation of delivery of educational opportunities by the creation of a single education department in the province which had been previously fragmented into six different departments. Emerging education policy at the time was formulated both inside and outside of government which addressed issues as far ranging as the management of schools to the curriculum itself. The reorganisation of the different spheres of government along the interim constitution entailed an overhaul of the administrations which supported the ministry and was driven by civil service transformation policy. This gave the management of the education department a particular form which was not always in the best interest of education management as the civil service in its entirety was undergoing restructuring from a command and control career driven one, to a relationship with civil society that was to be democratic and developmental in its approach.

3. Planning and planning implementation

Planning and planning implementation was extremely difficult for the new department. The department did not have adequate information on the numbers of learners as well as the resources at its disposal to serve the needs of the province. Ghost schools and teachers existed on the payroll system. The administration was in a poor state having been rejected by those that fought Bantu education and corrupted by years of Bantustan rule. In the initial years given the international attention focussed on South Africa, planning was donor driven and in the form of one off exercises. The department did not have a planning division within and the poor infrastructure in the province also did not help in developing adequate plans.
4. Organisation and establishment of structures

The organisation and establishment of the department was a product of its position in the provincial department where the province in its entirety was seen as a department which restricted certain powers of the provincial educational department. A strategic management team was initially appointed to oversee the transformation and establishment of the department and operated outside and above the department whilst schools continued to function. The were two approved organograms during the period of the study and both were never filled. Both structures suffered from similar problems of not being based on the principles of form following function. This resulted in the management echelon being relatively small in relation to the entire structure amongst other things. The number of inherited personnel were never verified and no skills audit was done before staff were absorbed into the new department. The filling of posts became increasingly haphazard as deadlines for the establishment of the new provincial administration were laid down and lateral movement between departments increased instability. The department to this day is having to defend its restructuring processes in court.

5. Human Resource Development

Within the Human Resources and Personnel functions, no review of job descriptions took place during this period, no work plans were ever drawn up, and no performance management system was put in place. In addition, no human resource development structures were formed, and little HRD planning occurred (including no needs analysis completed). Management and union relationships were uneasy during this period, with arenas outside Bisho bringing the two interests together in a structured way. Limited training occurred, mostly just on-the-job training. Supernumeraries were an unresolved issue during this period, with no common sense of ideal staff size agreed upon. Organograms of 1995 and 1997 were not properly filled, although most staff were moved onto the common Persal system.

6. Finance

Within the critical financial functions of the Department of Education a crisis had developed to breaking point by mid-1997, attributed largely to the decentralised finance system, and the concurrent operation of separate budgets until 1996/97. Recentralisation of finance began in 1997, and the MEC for Finance took over running the DOE’s finance. Little or no participation in had occurred in departmental budgeting up to 1997. Budget allocations to the province and the DOE did not take backlogs into account during this period, which led to under-funding. Debts of the DOE both inherited and new, only started to be serviced in 1997. Staff were moved onto a common Persal payroll system, with some difficulty. Accounting irregularities and filing problems persisted within the department, and it was difficult to redirected resources to new programme priorities.

7. Organisational Culture

The organisational culture of the education department was largely defined by the organisational histories of the personnel that formed the new department. The employees of the department came from different administrations inside the government
as well as non governmental organisations and institutions of higher learning. The highest number of employees were made up from career civil servants of the previous South African and Bantustan administrators and given the choice of provincial capital was dominated by Ciskei civil servants in the provincial headquarters. There were regional as well as racial differences in the past which were carried into the new administrations by those that entered the new administration from the previous government whilst those that joined the service from outside government departments also brought their own organisational culture. Expectations and insecurity haunted the new establishment. Bisho was not an inspiring place to live and work. Confusing lines of authority and the unclear roles of outside organisations such as trade unions also added to the poor organisational culture.

8. Curriculum

On the curriculum side, curriculum was standardised for the new province. A single matric examining body for the province was achieved, and the curriculum directorate grew its staff to four members by 1997. Bisho increasingly engaging more fully with curriculum framework discussions toward 1997. Curriculum in schools was cleansed of odious elements and teachers adapted to new policy. More materials, textbooks and further training was however needed, especially in-service training required by teachers to make full use of emerging curriculum 2005 philosophy at the time. Confusion over duplicated functions started to be cleared up by 1997, when the curriculum directorate settled into its niche focusing on grades R-9.

9. Teacher development

Within teacher development, no formal needs analysis/skills assessment was done during this period. In-service teacher training was done with very limited numbers of subject advisers (60), EDO's and the three teacher centres. Student intakes at colleges were reduced during this period, but student to teacher ratios were too low. No teacher redeployment had been discussed yet, and subject prioritisation failed at the implementation stage. Teacher development functions became better consolidated into a newly named directorate. Teacher training colleges were largely standardised in terms of operations and curriculum for students.

9. Conclusion

The report ends by way of considering cross-cutting themes which run across the eight focus areas. Most apparent of these is the structural instability brought about through trying to merge six apartheid departments of education and trying to overcome enormous inherited constraints and legacies. The second theme relates to the general lack of management capacity across all functional areas of the department during this period. Thirdly, the relationship between the province and national government is considered suggesting that provinces suffered from a "policy-overload", and resulted in polices flowing down from national level with little regard for implementation capacity. Provinces such as the Eastern Cape, with huge infrastructure backlogs, inherited Bantustan bureaucracies, and a large proportion of under-qualified teachers can be seen to have drawn the "short-end" of the stick in this regards.
In a sense drowning in this policy overload and overwhelming demand to deliver and at the same time transform, the department neglected to direct sufficient resources and time into strategic planning, especially around human resource development and budgeting. From 1997 the development challenges and need to streamline delivery became even more acute with fiscal constraints associated with the GEAR macro-economic strategy. Yet despite these cross-cutting constraining conditions, the DOE made a number of significant achievements during the period 1994-1997. Among these are the creation of a single consolidated budget, the establishment of a single examining body and single education system for the province, overhauling the apartheid curriculum and implementing a new curriculum, and standardising the teacher training system.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Imbewu commenced in 1997 on a three year project cycle ending this year (2000). The project grew out of the concern with the low quality of education in the province stemming primarily from inherited infrastructure and service backlogs including classroom backlogs, the lack of resources in schools, unqualified and underqualified teachers, among other factors. These problems were compounded by institutional and administrative constraints and problems associated with restructuring and amalgamating six separate departments into a single education department. This year sees the completion of the Imbewu project and an evaluation of its activities and impact on target schools and the Department of Education.

This report represents an attempt to describe and analyse base-line conditions in the Department of Education before the Imbewu project started in order to provide the Department of Education and the Imbewu Task Force with a clear picture of prevailing conditions at the time Imbewu started. In this respect, and assisted by hindsight, the study reconstructs and restores the institutional memory of the Department for the difficult and complex period from 1994-1997. Furthermore, the study identifies baseline indicators and characteristics against which restructuring and transformation, and indeed the efficacy of the Imbewu project, can be assessed.

1.2 Objectives

The study has three inter-related objectives:

- To undertake a situation analysis of the Department of Education before Imbewu started with particular reference to eight focus areas comprising human resource development; finance; organisation and establishment structures; teacher development; curriculum; planning and planning implementation; policy and policy implementation; and organisational culture.

- To restore institutional memory and collective experience to allow government to draw lessons vis-à-vis restructuring for enhanced service delivery;

- To determine final status conditions and key indicators for each of the eight focus areas against which the impact of Imbewu can be assessed.

1.3 Methodology

The study made use of a number of methods to gather and process information. These include:

Documentary research – The research team scanned and reviewed a number of policy documents and position papers, departmental memos and briefs, departmental strategic and operational plans, and research reports (a full list of this documentation is included in the bibliography). Accessing certain documentation, such as the strategic planning material used by the department at the time, proved difficult. This arises from the fact that the Department of Education currently has no resource centre or central location where documents are stored. Also, support from
departmental officials was not as forthcoming as one may have hoped for, which impeded the search for particular documentation.

**Interviews** – semi-structured in-depth interviews were held with key respondents from the Department of Education and other government departments, the trade union movement, academia, among others (see Appendix A). Tracking down and securing interviews with key persons in the department in the period under review proved more difficult than anticipated. This was a result of the unavailability of certain key persons, the disinterest of some to participate in the study, as well as the busy schedules of others which meant that only short interviews could be secured. Nonetheless, despite these constraints, the research team did manage to undertake interviews with a sufficient number of key respondents to allow for what we feel is an accurate and detailed analysis of the department at the time.

**Stakeholder workshops** - In order to test the analysis and views of the research team, two stakeholder workshops were conducted at which key findings were presented for discussion and debate. This allowed for interviewees as well as participants who had not been interviewed by the research team to contest and confirm the viewpoints and analysis of the researchers. Inputs from these workshops were then integrated into the report to add value and strengthen the analysis.

**1.4 Structure of the report**

The report is structured along the lines of the eight focus areas under review. The first critically interrogates the policy environment which informed and facilitated departmental restructuring and transformation; the second considers the two areas of planning that were very important in focussing the departments activities – one relating to internal strategic planning and the second addressing planning for servicing the needs of the province. The third section of the report, organisation and establishment structure, looks at the nature of the structure that began to emerge during the period 1994 to 1997. The processes and organizational problems in filling these structures are explored and an evaluation made of the extent to which a single department had been created by 1997. The fourth section of the report focuses on the key challenges facing the Human Resources directorate from 1994 to 1997, with particular respect to human resource policy, planning, and operating systems.

Section 5 considers the financial management, decentralization, funding, budgeting, debt, cash flow and accounting issues (including irregularities), which confronted the department at the time. Section 6, which focuses on organisational culture, looks at the different groups of people that came to work in the new provincial administration and explores the organisational and work culture and ethic that they brought with them. Other factors that contributed to the organisational culture such as the physical location of the living and working environment of the provincial administration and the role of trade unions are also reflected upon. Section 7 looks at the curriculum change and development process, from the initial standardising focus, through changing curriculum policy, planning and implementation. The final focus area, teacher development, looks at issues around teacher development policy and pre-service and in-service teacher training. Finally, by way of conclusion, a number of core themes which emerged from the study are explored, and the various successes and failures of the department are contextualised against an understanding of what was in fact possible.
2. POLICY AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

1.2 Introductory comments

Government has a dual role in the civil service. Firstly as employer it has to play the role of employment management and in this regard fulfil its role as manager of its employees. In this function Government has to recruit, retain and motivate employees, determine the numbers involved and the terms and conditions for their employment. The government also has overall economic management responsibility for the country. The level of expenditure on the civil service, which is determined by other factors relating to economic policy, has severe impact on its employment management function. This could result in civil servants benefits being affected as pressure is put on government to spend less on salaries and realign national budgets to reflect national interests and priorities. (Robinson, 1990)

In developing economies the civil service is the largest formal employer and balancing its responsibility towards its employees and citizens becomes more difficult given the size of the civil service and scarceness of paying jobs. These issues affect the government's ability to deliver and the livelihoods of its employees. The province of the Eastern Cape reflects these characteristics where the provincial education department is responsible for the running of schools and is the largest provincial department employer.

These influences are present for a government within a stable political and economic environment. The situation in South Africa during the period 1994 to 1997 was no means stable. A government of national unity had just been negotiated and was trying to redress centuries of political and economic deprivation through a process of transformation led by a newly elected government and implemented by an inherited bureaucracy. Furthermore period was preceded by unprecedented social and economic upheaval within which school, going youth had occupied the forward trenches in their battles against the Bantu education system.

The transition from the Apartheid State to a new democratic order necessitated changes in the structure and function of the civil service. The Provincial Education Department was part of this transition. The fragmented delivery through apartheid structures designed to maintain the oppressive and exploitative relations that characterised the previous government needed to be overhauled. Administrative duplication and unequal delivery of education was to be addressed by the creation of a new education department that approached education differently in schools and the communities.

This new education department was as much a product of the general transformation taking place in the civil service as it was a product of the transformation taking place in education. The restructuring of government administration reflected the three different spheres, namely national, provincial and local with some times concurrent and at other times exclusive powers assigned to these spheres of government. Education was both the responsibility of national as well as provincial government. Policy and funding was a national competence whilst the support and management of schools were to be a function of provincial departments. Tertiary institutions remained the function of national governments. This separation between policy formulation and implementation led to some of the problems that the province faced when the department was being established.
Following the elections held in April 1994, national as well as provincial legislatures were established, both with their own executive’s having education Portfolios assigned to certain members. Both legislatures had portfolio committees made up of members of parliament that served as monitoring bodies. Both the minister and the MEC had an administration to support them.

The MEC for the Eastern Cape was appointed in June 1994. To assist the MEC in setting up the department a strategic manager was appointed to oversee the establishment of the administration. The strategic manager assembled a Strategic Management Team that was drawn from the previous administrations as well as those outside the government who had been involved in education. Labour was also represented on the Strategic Management Team. Thus the process of the establishment of the new provincial department began. The first permanent secretary for education was appointed in January 1996 and was the last of the heads of provincial education departments to be appointed in the country 18 months after the MEC was appointed.1

This section is looking at the policies that affected the establishment and functioning of the provincial education department of the Eastern Cape and begins with an appreciation of the inherited administrative and infrastructure constraints that the department faced. The chapter then looks at both the administrative as well as the educational policies that influenced the organisation, establishment and culture of the provincial department of education of the Eastern Cape. It concludes with indicators of the extent to which a single education department was in the process of being achieved around the middle of 1997.

2.2 Inherited constraints

The period just after the first democratic elections in 1994 was characterised by great expectations by the people of South Africa of their newly elected government. The rural poor particularly in the homelands had much to look forward to as integration into the South African administration and economy promised better education, health and social benefits. The newly constituted government of the province of the Eastern Cape was faced with its most challenging period. It had the oldest homeland in the country with all the characteristics of a corrupt and desperately poor Bantustan. This then added to the pressures of transformation that the civil service and the education department had to deal with.

The province was suffering from a desperate shortage of schools and one of the first estimates based on a national survey undertaken by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) undertaken in April 1996 revealed the extent of the problem to be: -

(ECSEC Report August 2000)
- a shortage of 21 250 classrooms
- 1487 schools without toilets
- 1972 schools without water supply
- 2931 schools without sports fields

1 The First MEC was the first head of the education department drawn from educationists historically outside of the formal civil service. This heralded the lateral entry of personnel into the department at a management level, which had not been trained within the civil service.
- 4333 schools without electricity
- 4753 schools without telephones
- 5528 schools without libraries
- 5562 schools without laboratories

The province was also spatially differentiated with some areas relatively better equipped to deliver educational opportunities than other areas. The western areas of the province were generally better resourced compared to the Bantustan of Ciskei and Transkei. Homeland schools lacked any administrators or managers and educators performed the functions of teachers as well as administrators whilst in the more privileged area teachers taught and administrators managed. A division of labour existed in the more privileged areas between educators and administrators and this ensured that there was no confusion between the different functional areas of education management and teaching.

The first task that the education department was faced with was the challenge of delivering equal education opportunities to all its citizens. In order to do this its initial task was the merging of six different administrations into one. This was to enable an equitable delivery of educational opportunities to all the citizens of the province, which would be reflected in a single examination being written by all matriculants across the country. All this had to be done whilst education delivery was not to be disturbed and schools continued to function.

The provincial education department was brought into existence with the adoption of the interim constitution of the Government of National Unity. There was to be a provincialisation of education meaning the establishment of a single province that would administer to the educational needs of the province under the dual guidance of the provincial legislature and the national government. This was provided for under schedule 4 of the interim constitution which allowed for education to be the concurrent responsibility of national as well as provincial government.

The provincial education department was constituted out of 6 existing departments. These were from the two homelands namely Transkei and Ciskei as well as the former Republic of South Africa. Within the republic of South Africa there were 4 different education departments for the different race groups.

This duplication meant that there were parallel education management structures operating within the same geographical space in the former South Africa for the different race groups. Amalgamation meant a duplication of personnel as well as infrastructure in areas where more than one department was operating. This was in stark contrast to the homelands where there was an absence of support for educators.

A single department necessitated a single administration with a single budget. All the different administration ran their own budgets for educational programmes as well as paying of salaries. One unitary budget came into existence only during the financial year 96/97. Prior to that the department ran three different budgets for the different areas under its jurisdiction, which were separately approved by the provincial legislature. These financial systems were not only separate but also incompatible with each other, which further frustrated the amalgamation process. Given the size, complexity and geographical location of the places of employment, the creation of a
single database of employees linked to a common payroll was particularly difficult in a region characterised by poor communication infrastructure.

The establishment of the department was preceded by deterioration in the existing forms of administration just prior to the establishment of the new department. It was a stated policy of anti-apartheid organisations to make the country ungovernable and in pursuance of this the crippling and sabotage of administrations was a legitimate form of struggle against the apartheid state. This was reflected in the collapse of schooling and education. The Department of Education and Training Annual Report for 1992 reported that more than 16 000 instances of disruptions took place throughout the country and 11 million pupil days were lost. (EPU Quarterly 15 September 1993)

During late 1992 and 1993 there were also disruptions in schools as a result of action that was taken by members of the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) the majority union organising nationally. Teachers were striking against low salary increases as well as retrenchments that the department was proposing. Black teachers were aligning themselves with more militant forms of trade unionism in the country whilst the provincial and Bantustan administrations departments generally were also being organised.

For many the integration and amalgamation of the various departments presented an opportunity for an instant jump into higher job categories upon merger. Officers in the civil service of the homelands argued that they had been prejudiced under the homeland government and that the amalgamation would place them at a lower level than their South African counterparts. In this way self promotion and forced promotion was carried out by the administrators of the former homelands who argued that they would be unfairly prejudiced against when absorbed into new departments. Various commissions of enquiry were set up both nationally and provincially to investigate unfair promotions. The Transkei was a particular focus for many of these commissions.

The provincial education department inherited not only the assets but also the debts of the previous administration. During its first few months' service providers would table outstanding debts that they were owed by the departments predecessors. The non-payment of these electricity and telephone bills for example would result in the cutting off of services and unfairly reflect poorly on the state of administration of the new department whilst these were in fact inherited debts.

The newly constituted department was faced with its own problems of authority, responsibility and accountability, which were confusing and slowing delivery down during its initial period of establishment. These stemmed from its position within the government and administration and the role of the Public Service Commission and labour representatives when appointments were made. Administratively the department reported to the director general of the province whilst its political authority was to the provincial legislature via the member responsible in the executive. This has led to confusing lines of accountability for the head of department who was asked to account both by the Director General of the province as well as the political head of education in the province. Adding to this was the role of the National Department of Education who were setting norms and standards as well as receiving reports on the progress of educational programmes in the province. The Public Service commission was legally accountable to the President acting as a watchdog in the province, it had powers only to monitor and report. Its statutory role was to
ensure public service transformation principles, rather than deal with specific functional needs of education in the province.

The transformation process was rapid in its development of policy and slow in implementation. There had been a long lead in process to the development of policy but very little had been done to address issues of implementation. This was difficult for interest groups outside government to deal with and the new administration started to feel the difficulties of implementing transformation only when it began to implement the new policies.

The elected government having gained power was keen to consolidate the transformation and internalise it within the administration. This was done through the implementation of new policies at a rapid rate. These policies were emanating from education and public service administration and resulted in what policy implementers in the department refer to as policy overload. They were unable to prioritise the important policies and implement them. The process was driven by deadlines and not a strategic sense within the department. The department was not entrusted with the responsibility and freedoms to prioritise and phase in the new policies.

2.3 Transversal civil service policy influences

The major policy processes shaping the establishment and functioning of the education department were outside of the provincial department located in the wider provincial administration and nationally in the department of Public Service and Administration and the National Department of Education. The need to establish a functioning provincial administration together with the need to realign educational delivery towards nationally defined policy led to the particular form that the education department took.

Perhaps the biggest influence on the establishment of the education department during the period under review emerged not from the requirements of education but from the requirements of establishing a new civil service. In this way the establishment of the provincial education department was driven and implemented from national and provincial requirements both outside of education.

This has been supported by The Provincial Review Report commonly known as the Nhulolo Report emanating from the National Department of Public Service and Administration who found that new policies are set at the national level without due consideration to the organisational, financial and service delivery implications in the province. (Provincial Review Report, 1997) An example of this was the policy on student teacher ratios which meant a sudden increase in the number of teachers in the province with no consideration as to where the money to pay these teachers was to come from. This was implemented in 1997 with dire consequences for the provincial budgets.

Chapter five of the Public Service Act of 1994 provided for the size of the management echelon of the entire province which was based on the population size of the province. The vastness of the province, lack of infrastructure and the enormous backlogs were not factored into the allocation. This constrained the management ability of the province from the onset. In this way finance and public service policy dictated the size and form of the management of education in the province. Provincial administrations operated within a budget that was allocated by
the national government to the province. The province then in turn divided up this budget as an allocation to the different departments.

Provincially a decision was also taken that for the purposes of equity, all departments in the province would be headed by a permanent secretary which was the equivalent rank of a deputy director general. This was not related to the number of persons working in the department, neither the functions of the department nor the extent of the provincial budget it consumed. This had the net result of reducing the number of the ranks of the management in charge of education in the province in comparison to other provinces of similar size and needs.

The already restricted department was dealt a severe blow by the Voluntary Severance Packages that were offered to serving officials of the government. This mechanism arose out of one of the most contested areas during the negotiations that allowed for transitional arrangements in the country. It was agreed that civil servants employment was guaranteed for a minimum period of five years. In order for departments to be able to restructure, a voluntary retrenchment package was negotiated thus working around the issue of forced retrenchment. This was a negotiated tool and the employer had no right to refuse an employee if the employee requested the package and wanted to leave the service. The amount that the official would be paid was related to the numbers of years of service that the particular official had in the civil service. Longer serving officials stood to benefit greatly from the application of this tool as their pay out was substantial. This resulted in skilled personnel who knew that they had marketable skills leaving the department. They were easily absorbed into the private sector and went with a golden handshake. Many opted for this rather than an uncertain future in the service.

2.4 Educational policy influences

The policy of the existing state within which the education policy of the new government was to interact reflected the attempt by the state to regain control over the direction education was taking. This was characterised by unilateral restructuring such as the devolution of control through the model C schools. The process also included the regional integration of all departments excluding Bantustans. This restructuring moved away from crude ideologies of racial control to the long term control of the market order. (WITS EPU 15 Sept 93) The state was attempting to privatise education and absolve itself of its responsibility towards its citizens.

The educational policies that the provincial department was to implement were long being formulated outside of government whilst at the same time there were policies that the South African government and the homeland administrations were implementing. This was the time of duel power in South Africa. Both these were to be merged in forming the policies that established the function and form of the department. Given the fragmented and unequal delivery of education that was taking place in the country prior to 1994, the goal of national policies were to integrate, redress imbalances, and transform the curriculum for students as well as the training of teachers.

The National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) was the main extra parliamentary body at the time that was influencing future education policy. By December 1992 the NECC completed a comprehensive policy review which was contained in 13 reports.
The Centre for Education Policy Development was established by the head of the ANC education department and focussed on the structure and system of schooling, integration of education and training, rural education, language policy, teachers, finance and the bureaucracy, science and technology education and post secondary education. These were subsequently included in the RDP.

COSATU focussed on human resource policy which incorporated a policy for literacy and adult basic education. The goals of its policy were to destroy apartheid education, achieve free and compulsory education for all children, develop literacy, numeracy and critical thinking, and the building of formal education systems geared towards providing specific and technical skills. (WITS EPU Sept 1993)

Government consolidated its policy positions in its white paper, which was promulgated in 1995. Provincial departments in terms of the white paper had to determine goals and target dates to suit their circumstances and monitoring system. (Edusource number. 12 April 96). Although the policy making process was informed from below, the implementation was very much top down. Provincial personnel were included in national structures. However this only resulted in these officials being a conduit for the implementation of national policies. The policies were based on values and developed by educationist that we involved in policy formulation at the time. These educationist were outside of government and worked in extra parliamentary political organisations NGO's, and labour and mainly dealt with the unequal delivery of education based on racial categorisation These policies were strong on the equalisation and transformation of racist curricular but they were weak on the practicalities of implementation. State craft as one respondent called it was not their forte. The policies had no grasp of the delivery within a civil service administration. They lacked in interpreting these into functions and aligning them with budgets.

One of the first attempts at equalising education delivery addressed the issue of student pupil ratios. These guidelines developed nationally sometimes led to restructuring which was not aligned with capacity in the province. For example in 1997, when 2000 teachers were employed in an attempt to adjust the pupil teacher ratios in accordance with national norms that were developed, no consideration for the financial implications seems to have been entered into. This resulted in a crash of the province when the budget could not support the increased salary bill. A moratorium was then placed on the creation and filling of new posts. Due to the fact that money was not ring fenced in the department, this seriously impacted on the programmes that were being implemented, as programme budgets are the first to suffer when cuts are to be made and salaries are always secured. As a result of this some school building projects were stopped before completion.

The provincial policy of the department with regard to schools reflected the practicalities of implementation in the issues they addressed. Inclusivity and consultation were the key principles guiding education policy at the provincial level. School governance policy allowed for democratically elected and inclusive governing school bodies to be put in place. The provincial department was also establishing curriculum advisory councils at a regional and provincial level which consisted of the teaching profession, educational forums, tertiary institutions and organised parent and student groups. The support and management assistance for these bodies were not catered for by nationally allocated budgets. The province being closer to the constituency it served was forced to be sensitive to communities involved in school governance issues.
Pupil staff ratios and a unitary examination were important indicators of a new department and educational system evolving. These were forced through by the national department without due consideration for the resources required. The writing of a single senior certificate examination administered by the province was an administratively huge task and only possible at the end of 1996. Many provinces were wracked by senior certificate examination paper leaks and the provincial administrations were called to account for this lack of control.

Instability at the level of the senior manager and the political head of department also did not assist in stabilising the department. The unclear lines of authority of the administration caused the setting up of a stable department problems. There was no direct link between the political head and the administration and they were often changed without regard to each other and a lack of continuation was the result. Programmes conceptualised, initiated and implemented during the tenure of different political and administrative heads were to be implemented by others that followed. The departures and appointments were sometimes acrimonious and did not always result in the acceptance of the predecessor's plans.

Lastly macro economic policy at this time was also working against the department. The government's new Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy was beginning to negatively affect social spending. The government was forced to continually reinterpret ten years of free and compulsory education and started talking of creating conditions for educational opportunities to be realised rather.

2.5 Conclusion

The department was faced with tremendous pressures in its initial years to both transform itself and maintain delivery in accordance with the responsibilities that were assigned to the ministry under which it fell. In the face of these pressures keeping focused on strategic priorities was not always easy and supported by wider administration and allocation of resources.

The establishment of a single department however was accomplished having being reflected in the writing of a single senior certificate examination and the creation of a provincial department which did not exist before. The birth of this new department was not easy but given the constitutional arrangements, was inevitable through the acceptance of policy and enactment of enabling legislation.

What emerges out of the discussion on policy and policy implementation is that there was no prioritisation and hence orderly implementation of policies in the department. The department was flooded with policy directives emanating from national and provincial administrative and educational imperatives. These policies were understood but not internalised by staff to the extent that the departments own position was developed and defended by its administrators. The policies were understood as policies in their own right but not in relation to each other and within the establishment of provincial administration. There does not seem to be a strategic sense in their implementation.

This emanated from the understanding of policies remaining the realm of senior managers who were either briefed or participated in information dissemination workshops targeted at them. This policy understanding was not taken into a proper
operationalisation phase where the functionaries and implementers in the department were able to act on with understanding. This was true both of educational policies as well as civil service policies that the department had to implement. The Department needed to prioritise and fight for provincial educational administrative prioritisation. This needed to be done in the face of constant prioritisation and pressures that were emanating from outside the department.

The lack of policy analysis skills has been identified as a key weakness within the public service of many developing countries. As is noted in ‘Commonwealth Strategies for Reform’ 1995, policy development, with its cycle of policy appraisal, through identification of options, decisions, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, is being given greater emphasis and more systematic attention within Commonwealth governments as part of their public service reform” (p21).

By the middle of 1997 the Imbewu project was in a position to interact with a consolidated department on paper, in policies and through legislation. The practicalities of implementation however were far from complete.

2.6 Indicators

- Administrative duplication
- Unequal access to management resources by schools
- Minimal provincial policy
- National policy dominates
- Civil service restructuring prioritised over education
- Very few links between tertiary institutions and the department
- Spending patterns prioritised nationally
- Spatially differentiated education delivery
- Desperate classroom shortages in some regions
- No separation of education and administrative staff in schools
- Single departmental structure on paper only
- Investigations and commissions into the department
- No clear lines of authority and accountability
- No policy prioritisation
- A lack of policy understanding amongst staff
- No internal policy development
- Increasing applications for the VSP
- Insufficient stability of the senior management echelon
3. PLANNING AND PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION

3.1 Introductory comments

Good planning is dependent on reliable information and commitment to following up plans with implementation and monitoring. Planning for primary school education meant knowing the numbers of potential learners, their spread across the province, the resources at the department’s disposal and adequate resources dedicated to planning. The provincial education department after the 1994 elections did not have accurate information on the numbers and location of learners as well as an audit of the resources at its disposal. There was no accurate information on the people living in the homelands and in some instances there were schools and teachers that were being funded that did not exist. Furthermore planning was not catered for within the organisational structure and there was no monitoring and feedback of performance. It is not evident that a strategy was put in place to assist in the development of planning both at a strategic level and to address the needs of the province at a physical and human resource level during that period.

This section looks at the two areas of planning that were very important in focussing the department’s activities. The first relates to internal strategic planning and the second addresses planning for servicing the needs of the province.

3.2 Internal planning constraints

The change from a tightly controlled delivery system to one that was dynamic and able to change with the needs of the province required both consistency of implementers, long term commitment and freedom for strategic managers to choose the best solutions possible having been informed by the needs on the ground. This was not forthcoming in the department at the time. Old and cumbersome procedures inherited from a different era were in place, political and administrative heads were changing and the department was open to whoever would fund a planning exercise.

These planning exercises generally lacked continuity and their once off nature prevented them from having a sustained long-term involvement in the department. They were governed by funder’s priorities and cycles and not needs that the department had resulting in the department being at the mercy of funding priorities. Funding priorities are determined by donor agencies and for as long as education and the Eastern Cape were on the donor priority list, donor agencies assisted with planning.

Further compounding the problem was that the numbers of schools and teachers was also not in the records of the department. This meant that the department besides not knowing the numbers of students it had to serve, also did not know the resources currently in its possession that it could utilise. The destruction and undermining of records was a result of inferior educational management systems and active sabotage called for by the Mass Democratic Movement at the time when making the country ungovernable was a noble cause.

The department was itself changing and delivery had to be maintained whilst planning had to address the delivery process as well as the product. Planning had to take place whilst delivery continued. In this environment there were no tried and
tested formula or systems and procedures in place that could instantly come up with solutions. The department was open to suggestions and the new political masters were inundated with solutions funded by donors and implemented by NGO’s and consultants all wanting to be a part of the new South Africa. In the first three years of the departments existence there were at least three different strategic plans drawn up by three different foreign countries represented by their aid agencies.²

The department also faced the problem of the lack of continuity at the level of leadership both politically and administratively. The new incumbents did not trust the previous heads choices and wished to implement plans that they were familiar with. Strategic plans would then be drawn up using different analytical tools and lower level staff began to lose faith in the leadership ability to plan and follow things through.

The strategic management team report reflects some of these problems. This was the first strategic plan of the department and it had legitimacy problems from the onset. The SMT was set up by the first MEC of the department of education who put the team in place, set up the terms of reference and was part of the process of developing the report. Less than a month before the report was to be tabled in the legislature the MEC was changed and the report was tabled by the incoming MEC. The process from there to a planning session for implementation never really got around and the subsequent planning session reverted to a deployment session for the filling of key posts where clear groupings put forward different positions. Things were at a delicate stage in the establishment of the department and serious interests were at stake. Positions were to be filled in the new administration and those that were already in the establishment felt challenged by those they perceived to be using the SMT as a way into the administration.

The lack of integrated systems for planning purposes led to a mismatch between planning and budgeting. There was no relationship between strategic planning and budgets that were drawn up. Strategic policy intervention originated nationally and was expected to be implemented locally in the province through provincial programmes. These different spheres of government did not relate to each other and within each other in order to put together comprehensive plans.

3.3 Needs driven Planning

The first comprehensive needs analysis done for the education department was commissioned by the MEC in mid 1995. The RDP funded the building of schools in the province initially and allocation went from the RDP fund to the national department of education and then to the provincial departments. The process entailed the appointment of a co-ordinator who set up structures to asses the needs of the province and how best these could be addressed given the limited budgets.

The areas that fell within the previous South African Governments jurisdiction had a priority list which they had been following in identifying their spending patterns for school building programmes. The former Transkei and Ciskei did not have any such prioritisation lists. This programme had to rely on existing departments and hence suffered from legitimacy problems. Communities were not entirely convinced that the

² From the interviews it became apparent that GTZ, DfiD and USaid all were involved in strategic planning exercises with the department.
inherited officials to whom they had been forwarding their requests for assistance were now going to change the way in which they would respond.

This needs identification process resulted in a list that went to the public works department. It was not verified before going into implementation which resulted in some problems where more was built than necessary and prioritisation was through what the traditional chiefs, who were the authority in rural areas, decided was a priority. The lack of co-ordination also resulted in schools being built where there were no access roads or water provision. The RDP programme in its support of emerging contractors resulted in building programmes not meeting deadlines and poor workmanship in some instances. Tenders were not properly elicited and the capacity of contractors not fully verified before contracts were awarded.

This was followed by the education management system which was set up in 1996 and where for the first time a provincial picture began to emerge as to the needs of the province. In mid 1996 a survey of infrastructure needs was done as part of a national infrastructure needs survey. This placed the shortage of classrooms at over 20,000 units.

Thus different processes all sought to identify the educational needs of the province. All of them were consistent in one respect. The budget allocated for education in the province was nowhere near what was needed to deal with the backlogs, equalise delivery and deal with the increased school intake.

For the purpose of servicing existing schools, national prescripts, directives, and procurement policies had to be followed. These were cumbersome and very bureaucratic in nature during a period of rapidly changing curricula and syllabi. When provincial priorities were different from national prescripts and exemptions had to be sought the process became near impossible.

The only planning tool in place at the time was the tenth day returns. The tenth day returns were crucial in getting information from the schools that were functioning. The tenth day returns were requests that were submitted by the schools on the tenth day after opening and reflected the enrolments for the year. These were being submitted by the departments but not accurately. There was a tendency for schools to inflate their requirements as allocations were always trimmed. In this way schools were able to at least meet some of their requirements. The tenth day returns however only assisted with schools that existed. Communities that did not have schools had to approach district offices of the department of education and request that schools be built. Thus the planning process was not proactive but responsive to requests.

The lack of planning and the rushing into the implementation of plans some times had drastic consequences for educational delivery. In mid 1997 the budget of education was frozen by the MEC for finance when it became apparent that there was not enough money in the province. Cheques were bouncing and departmental spending seemed to be haphazard. This drastic step by the provincial MEC for finance resulted in some school building projects being stopped half way through construction.

The lack of infrastructure in the province seriously hampered any serious planning to take place. In many districts computers, telephones and faxes were lacking and planning a meeting was not just done by phoning or faxing. Notices of meetings had to be hand delivered which often meant physically driving to inform participants of a
meeting. The manual recording of spending also led to the record keeping being not updated timeously and money committed was not tied up with money spent and what was available.

A major focus of planning in the province entailed the refocusing of spending away from areas that were resourced to areas that were under resourced. The newly established department faced the problem of projects that were committed by the old government. The department could not get out of agreements already in place and in this way budgets for future projects were already committed.

3.4 Conclusion

Planning and the implementation of plans by the department during its initial years was not consistently being monitored. This was as a result of inefficiencies both inside the department as well as the difficult conditions under which these plans had to be prepared and executed. Under these conditions the work of the department was seriously compromised as one respondent put it “planning was not only incidental but accidental”. The need for planning was recognised. However the plans that were produced (three of them) did not seem to build on each other. Plans that were drafted by some people, were not embraced by other people, therefore there was no continuity and a resultant loss of faith in the value of planning.

The plans that were produced did not get implemented by the department. This led to work being carried out with a very limited myopic focus. The bigger picture was missing in the minds of the workers of the department.

In order for the department to withstand the pressures being exerted on it from within the administration and the demands of the province, it needed to present a coherent, logically arrived at set of goals. These then could be used in defence of the department’s activities, as they would be in keeping with the ultimate objectives of national transformation of education and the establishment of a provincial administration. These would have been reflected in shifting expenditure patterns both programmatically and geographically as the plans were being implemented.

3.5 Indicators

- Insufficient accurate information on which to base planning
- No accurate needs analysis
- No accurate internal skills data base
- An absence of internal strategic planning
- Donor driven planning
- No dedicated planning component
- Cumbersome planning data collection methods
- One off planning with no follow up
- No links between planning and budgeting
- Historically driven spending patterns
4. ORGANISATION AND ESTABLISHMENT

4.1 Introductory comments

A provincial department of the government is defined geographically and programmaticalby by its area of jurisdiction and objectives of the ministry that it serves. The organisation and establishment of this department is based on the functions it has to perform having been informed by the education ministry by the needs of people within the province of the Eastern Cape.

The education department was not a new entity but for historical reasons an amalgamation of different existing departments. This was bolstered by new recruits brought in from outside the establishment passionately involved in education through other organs of civil society. In essence it was not a new establishment but a realignment of existing departments already functioning together with organizations and individuals outside of government.

The organisation and establishment of the education department was driven in the main by its position within the establishment of the entire provincial administration. The province was seen as a department and headed by a director general just like any other national department. This meant that within the province there was one accounting officer. Unless power was delegated, the accounting officer was ultimately responsible for finances and the establishment of the department. This resulted in all appointments being made on the approval of the provincial director general. In this way political or administrative heads of departments had only the power to recommend, as the final decision did not rest with them. This resulted in the education department not being an autonomous entity able to decide on its form and structure based on mandates it received from the provincial administration.

This section looks at the nature of the structure that began to emerge under the government of national unity during the period 1994 to 1997. There were two organigrams during this period, one in 1995 and another in 1997. Prior to this the different departments were brought together and overseen by a Strategic Management Team. The processes and organizational problems in filling these structures are explored and the chapter ends with a sense of the extent to which a single department was formed.³

4.2 The Strategic Management Teams

The process leading to the establishment of the new department began after the appointment of the MEC. A strategic manager was first appointed for each department in the province. The strategic manager in turn appointed a Strategic Management Team. Officials from the different departments, trade union

³ “By no stretch of the imagination could one say that those starting the new administration would get an indication of what organizational structure would be in place. It was true to say that a new cadre of administrator was recruited and this process was negotiated to get the old guard out of management whilst not creating a huge outcry so that the new administration would be undermined by all that existed before '94.”
representative and other appointed personnel constituted the SMT. The strategic manager had to develop a mission and vision for each department together with the functions of the department guided by the interim constitution, which defined the functional areas of responsibility of the different spheres of government. The initial task of the strategic manager was to assimilate the applicable legislation, consolidate the stock of the department into one register, and begin the process of merging the different budgets into one.

The appointment of the SMT in 1994 was over and above the existing management. It was a superstructure that operated over and above the different departments whilst they continued to function. This ensured that delivery of education support to the schools remained uninterrupted. This parallel nature of the Strategic Management Team made it open to suspicion. Those working within the administration believed the SMT members were restructuring the department in such a way as to guarantee their own entry into the future administration. They have charged that this is the reason the administration is filled with educators resulting in a lack of managerial competence in the department.

The terms of reference for the SMT were, as reported by the MEC to provincial legislature on 23 August 1994

- To develop the mission statement of the Ministry.
- To recommend educational reform in order to attain efficiency and effectiveness of the new ministry.
- To make recommendations as to how the six administrations could be integrated.
- To make recommendations as regards the structure of the ministry for the purpose of achieving the goals and objectives formulated in the mission statement.
- To make inputs towards formulation of policy for the new ministry.
- To assist the ministry to determine priorities.
- To make any other recommendations necessary to facilitate the process of restructuring, integration and rationalisation.
- To perform any other task that may be assigned to the team by the MEC.

The terms of reference as reflected were strong on developing a vision but weak on combining these with practical implementation considerations. The terms of reference were not inward looking and did not concentrate enough on the internal workings and functioning of the existing departments. An assessment of existing infrastructure both physical and human was critical at this stage and would have indicated what was possible and averted many of the organisational deficiencies that plagued the department later.

Recruitment was through the office of the Premier who had an acting director general and a legal team. Advertisements appeared in all local and national newspapers for senior positions whilst mass absorption for posts that were not managerial or strategic took place from the existing departments. The provincial service commission oversaw the appointments by way of approving organograms and the use of proxies in the interviewing panels.

4.3 The 1995 and 1997 organograms

The first organisational structure to be approved for the education department was in 1995 and subsequently a second structure was approved in 1997. A third structure
is to be implemented this year. The 1995 structure contained 5 divisions, which included a Culture, Youth and Sport division.

### 1995 organisation and establishment structure

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<td>Professional Support Services</td>
<td>Regional Coordination</td>
<td>Standard Education</td>
<td>Admin Support Services</td>
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<td>Directorate Arts and Culture</td>
<td>Directorate Planning</td>
<td>Directorate Regional officesO</td>
<td>Directorate ECD, Primary and Secondary Education</td>
<td>Directorate Personnel Administration</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Directorate Museum and Heritage Resources</td>
<td>Directorate Curriculum and Policy Development</td>
<td>Directorate Tertiary and Adult Education</td>
<td>Directorate Provisioning Administration</td>
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<td>Directorate Library Services and Archives</td>
<td>Directorate EDS and Subject Advisory</td>
<td>Directorate Specialist services and Specialist Education</td>
<td>Directorate Financial Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Directorate Youth and Sport</td>
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<td>Directorate Communication Services</td>
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A criticism of the 1995 organisational and establishment structure was that it did not make provision for labour issues and had no capacity do deal with donors and outside funding. This was a reflection of its inherited nature, as the previous government did not see the need to consult worker representatives and had no friends outside the department especially internationally. By December 1995 the department had appointed the permanent secretary 5 deputies and 12 directors together with 6 regional directors. (Edusource no. 11 Dec 95)

By late 1997 there were still posts that were not filled. At this point the department still did not know the number of staff that it had. The process of a head count had not been completed and personnel were not loaded onto the existing organogram but held against a parallel structure. The department had released a total of 1187
personnel through the VSP costing in excess of R12m. (Standing Committee Report 18 September 1997)

Towards the end of 1997 a new organogram was approved for the department of education which separated the Arts, Culture and Heritage division to another ministry. The main features of the new structure were that:

1. The establishment dealt with head office, six (6) regional offices and forty one (41) district offices.

2. Four new Branches were created viz., Planning and Management Information Systems, Education Provisioning and Management, Human Resource Management and Financial Management.

3. Educational planning, research and information technology was now linked closely with policy.

4. The education management information system and information technology were now catered for in the structure.

5. Education provision and management now grouped together all functions that contribute effectively to provisioning and support.

6. Finances and Human Resource functions were separated given the large numbers of personnel and finances that the department managed.

7. The new structure tried to decentralise functions as far as possible.

**1997 Head Office Organisation and Establishment Structure.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch and Research</th>
<th>Branch Provision and Management</th>
<th>Branch Human Resource Management</th>
<th>Branch Financial Management</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning and Research</td>
<td>Education</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division Policy and Research</th>
<th>Division Curriculum Development and Management</th>
<th>Division Human Resource Administration</th>
<th>Division Provisioning Administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division Education Planning and EMIS</td>
<td>Division General and Further Education</td>
<td>Division Human Resource Utilisation</td>
<td>Division Financial Administration</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Division ABET, Vocational and Teacher Education</td>
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<td>Division Special Needs Education</td>
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<td>Division Quality Assurance and Assessment Procedures</td>
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The Arts Culture and Heritage section now fell under a newly created ministry. Together with the staff exclusively performing these functions some staff from the administration and finance sections of the original combined department went into the new department. This negatively affected the education department as it lost some shared capacity.

The same problems that beset the old structure now affected the new structure. Absorption led to double parking in the same post. No assessment had been done of existing personnel. As long as staff fulfilled the entry requirements, personnel were absorbed. No assessment of ability or performance was done. A comprehensive head count had not been done in the province.\(^4\) The education department was unable to declare any supernumeraries and the instability of the department continued.

Today the education department has 97 000 persons. It constitutes half of the public administration of the province and half the provincial budget of over R7bn. This constitutes 7000 institutions with R7.2bn Budget. It has never recovered from the initial decisions around the establishment of the education department and the small size of the management structure is reflected in the comparison below with the adjoining province of Kwa Zulu-Natal.

**Approximate Number of Management Personnel per Rank.**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>KZN</th>
<th>EC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent general</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Dir. Gen.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Dir.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional CD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Dir.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interview respondent

The Chapter J prescriptions standardised the management size for all departments in the Eastern cape province, no matter how big or small the department, the same sized management structure was created.

Although the management structure of the department was seen to be small, all the posts were never filled. Even when there was a loss of personnel through attrition. the posts were not filled. For example only 34% of the Educational Development Officers posts were filled. Only 18% of Subject Advisor posts were filled.(Former SG). These were key support functions for schools in the province.

The provincial administration had a verification process that was located at Bulembu Airport. This process entailed a physical head count and updating of personnel files. According to respondents the process was never fully completed and no report has decisively counted the number of people that work in the administration of the

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\(^4\) According to a NEHAWU official the then director general first said 51 000 personell needed to be retrenched in the province. He then revised this to 38 000 and finally down to 18 000.
Eastern Cape although it did identify all work stations and assisted with the elimination of some non existent teachers and schools.

The functions of admin and finance remained at head office to maintain control. This was similar to other departments in order to maintain and strengthen a provincial structure. The regions were the head offices of the previous administrations and strengthening them would have led to encouraging the inequalities that existed before integration. The departmental structure was small at head office with the bulk of the servicing of schools taking place at the regional level. The district offices functioned mainly as conduits from the schools to the regional and head office. This situation is to be accepted in the new 2000 structure of the department.

4.4 The Process Of Filling The Posts And Organisational Deficiencies

The filling of the posts took place from the top and went progressively to the lower posts. As time caught up with the process it became more haphazard with increasingly little regard for procedural requirements. This was followed by mass absorption into the lower levels of the structure and in this way persons were not recruited but simply absorbed. In filling the organogram, there was no person to post match. The Bulembu process loaded persons onto a parallel structure as a way of getting them onto a single system which caused further confusion in the establishment of the department.

All of the respondents indicate that one of the most crippling features of the education department was its management structure which was not developed from the bottom up by understanding the functions that needed to be performed and building a structure to fulfil this but by an allocation on the number of managers drawn from an interpretation of chapter J of the Public Service Regulations. On the basis of this the province decided to have 153 managers in education and that all departments were to be headed by a permanent secretary which was the equivalent rank of a deputy director general (this was a political decision). This led to the bigger departments such as education being disadvantaged when compared to smaller departments as it restricted the rank and number within the management structure.

There was a lot of lateral movement of officers. People got absorption and appointments letters at the same time. Posts were being filled in all departments simultaneously and potential candidates would apply for many posts at the same time. This resulted in an officer being appointed to more than one post within a very short period of time. The stability of the department was seriously hampered in this way as opportunities arose simultaneously in all departments for the upward mobility of staff. Serving officials would apply for posts in all departments and some times be successful in being appointed to more than one position in a very short space of time. In this way positions would be filled and others become vacant as there was no

5 A situation would arise where for example the interviewing panels were not the same for the same post and different candidates. Some times the interviewing panel would change before all the candidates were interviewed.

6 The process of developing an organogram is like building a house. You have to determine the control posts. Due to the merging of established departments no proper investigation was done at the lowest levels. For any structure to be operative form has to follow function. Thus it was important to first establish the functions of the department and build the structure around this.
departmental co-ordination in the filling of posts as departments competed for the best candidates amongst themselves. The Director General's office was supposed to be the point of this co-ordination.

The involvement of trade unions assisted as well as created some problems for the establishment of the department. The COSATU aligned trade union were supportive of the government and foresaw the rationalisation process. Initially SADTU and NEHAWU did not support their members taking the voluntary severance package but later changed their position although not actively encouraging their members, did allow their members to take the package.

There were various persons and organisations involved in the establishment of the new structure and their roles and responsibilities were not clearly defined or understood by all the persons involved. Compounding this at the time was that there were no job descriptions for the newly created posts and appointments were left open to interpretation.

All respondents did not share criticism of the size of the structure. Not all were convinced that the structure was small. Some felt that the support staff was too many in relation to line functions and that there were a number of duplications both within and outside of the organogram. In some instances the support staff were more than the line staff as the department was forced to hold onto staff despite them not having any tasks allocated to them. This situation persists today where personnel are held additional to the approved structure.

Delegation of responsibility was seen as maturity of structures and that the structure was beginning to function. This was done to speed up the establishment and free up the higher paid officials to perform other more pressing tasks and concentrate their energies at a policy level rather that administrative tasks which they were performing. Thus delegation took place but with no understanding and appreciation of the powers and roles that were being delegated resulting in a disjuncture between authority and responsibility. Although lower officials had responsibility delegated to them, this was not accompanied by concurrent authority for example to allocate and direct resources in pursuance of executing the delegated responsibility.

Prioritisation and budgets rested in different departments. Line departments would budget for school infrastructure for example but the Public Works Department would have to implement the plan. This would lead to a mismatch between what was needed and what could be done as the education department did not have the expertise to correctly cost what they were requesting from the public works department although funding for school building would rest within the education department.

Although the 1995 organogram was to some extent informed by an analysis of the functions that were required much effort was expended on filling the posts at head office rather than organising the regions where delivery of the department was to take place.

A situation arose where the head office was filled with personnel and the regions were left unorganised. This is a further reflection of the top down nature of the establishment and organisation of the department that was not informed by the logic of form following function.
The department is currently still defending cases in court over its interpretation of applying the Voluntary Severance Package. Applicants are arguing that the provincial department did not apply the national policy correctly. The negotiated nature of the VSP meant that the interest of the serving official was above all else including the establishment of the department. The net result is that the department lost experienced personnel with skills for which it paid dearly both in cash and skills drainage.

A common payroll in the form of Persal was introduced in 1996/97 and was the first time that this was introduced to the Ciskei and Transkei civil servants. This brought with it the equalisation of pay for all those in the service and loaded the homeland civil servants onto the South African Tax system. This had serious tax implications for those employed by the homeland administrations as their tax increased to over 40% from being as low as 26%. This instant jump created hardships for many families who were unable to meet their commitments.

4.5 Conclusion

By the middle of 1997 the establishment of a single department had been attempted to be organised by the approval of two structures. These were however more easily approved than implemented as similar problems affected both being fully populated.

The process at arriving at the structure of the department was clearly driven by a top down approach by forces outside of provincial education. This led to a dysfunctional department where implementing policies became difficult when the structure did not support the functions of the department.

The size and proportions of the management structure were also affected by this establishment process. The structure did not create a balance between line functions and support functions. Trying to mould an inherited structure into a form that will support new functions has not worked. Research into the functions should have directed the form of structure.

It would be the ideal situation if the administration could operate with the support of stable political and administrative leadership. To the extent that this is possible should be seen as a positive reflection of the functioning of the department and there would be no need for changes in political and administrative heads. Thus the changing of the heads of the department was a constraint to the establishment of a stable department as much as it was the reflection of a non performing department.

A balance needs to be attained by all who work in the department as to their autonomy, authority, responsibility, accountability with regard to the work they are performing. It is possible to arrive at a working environment by balancing and asserting one position within the administration in relation to ones location within the structure. This will enhance and give a sense of purpose to workers of the department. This would have been possible had there been clear job descriptions at the time.

4.6 Indicators

- A structure reflecting historical functions
- Department not having authority over finances and appointments
- The department run by the strategic management team
• A department not in control of the task of filling the organogram
• An empty approved organogram
• Staff held additional to the structure
• Staff not loaded onto an approved structure
• Undeclared supernumeraries
• Inadequate job descriptions
• No performance measurement for filling of posts
• Absorption of personnel
• An unknown personnel complement
• A small management structure
• Ghost schools and staff
• A haphazard process of filling posts
• No person to post match
• No relationship between management structure and functionaries
• Insufficient co-ordination in the filling of posts
5. HUMAN RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL

5.1 Introductory Comments

The Human Resources Directorate was faced with integrating six different administrations in 1994, inheriting a civil service from two former homelands and a racially divided Cape Province, that were riddled with problems. The policy of making the Bantustans ungovernable during the struggle was successful to the extent that it could not be undone in a single sweep.

A Human Resources Directorate in any government department is responsible for hiring staff, pegging salaries and conditions of employment, running these systems and putting in place systems for staff development, motivation and performance management. While it is unreasonable to expect a Human Resources section to individually manage each staff member in a large department like the Department of Education, they should ensure that systems are in place for managers to manage their staff in all sections.

This section looks at some of the challenges facing the Human Resources directorate from 1994 to 1997, human resource policy, planning, and operating systems. Some indicators for this period are outlined by way of conclusion.

5.2 Creating a single department of education

No interim structures had been in place for education before 1994, so the elections represented a significant point in the life of the six outgoing departments of education. Despite the change in political masters, service delivery had to continue while the Strategic Management Team's went about designing a new staff structure. The various departments that had made up the apartheid structures continued to operate. This continued and parallel operation of the outgoing departments of education impacted on the new Department of Education (DOE), the effects of which are still being felt. The separate departments continued to function, and to this day have different work cultures. Systems of each department were completely different, and only now in 1999 have these been 90% standardised.

The strategic management teams were put together from seconded employees and specialists. Task teams were organized around certain functions. While the SMT's worked, line functions continued being run by the inherited staff (for example salaries). On this basis the systems from the previous departments continued to operate in terms of the traditional personnel functions. While this ensured that day-to-day operations did not grind to a halt, it also allowed for staff to become entrenched and set in their work practices, breaking the momentum of change which the elections had brought. This continued operation delayed the inevitable teething problems, which only emerged up to two years after the elections. This was unfortunate in the sense that staff and the public looking at the DOE's performance expected problems to have emerged soon after April 94, and by 1997 when the serious financial difficulties became evident, people were less patient and understanding, as the SADTU respondent pointed out.

Undoubtedly the DOE has had a difficult transformation, human resources issues within the department were cause for concern, with changes in political leadership
echoing the instability (the first education MEC was the first MEC fired in the country).

5.3 Human Resources Policy and Planning

During this period significant planning was done within the DOE, facilitated by the Public Service Administration. Training and workshopping was undertaken, and planning at least twice a year. This planning appears to have been for the entire DOE, not only the Human Resources section. Planning within the directorate seems to have been less frequent.

Human Resources policy during the 1994 to 1997 period was linked very closely to national policy and legislation. This national policy was set in forums such as the Labour Relations Council. Senior managers from the department were involved in policy development at a national level, and would then bring it down to province. For example the Director served on many national structures which negotiated policy. At the local level unions fed into provincial chambers on issues like teacher appraisal. This process of feeding policy from a national level, which was still under development, down to a provincial level seems to have had its limitations. As the Director pointed out:

"Policy is not understood and implemented by everyone in the dept due to the ´culture of non-reading´. Staff do not bother to read the policies and do not input or comment when invited to do so. Due to a lack of understanding of policy then, staff fail to implement it in the manner in which it was intended."

Negotiating through the new labour relations regime was a time-consuming endeavour for the new Human Resources Directorate, and ensuring that staff within the section were versed with the new policy and emerging legislation was a focus for the section. During this period the directorate seems to have run along the lines of a traditional personnel section, with functions like hiring of staff and salaries payment forming the bulk of the work. The more human resource development oriented activities, did not seem to be a major focus of the directorate.

5.4 Human Resource Development Activities

There was a need within the directorate to strike a balance between human resource development, and everyday administration. It was only in 1996 that the Human Resource Development section was set up within the department, consisting of one staff member. Prior to that the department had focused only on personnel and administration. What training had occurred was uncoordinated and mostly in response to opportunities individuals saw to develop their careers. Training had been provided by institutions like FHIG, and was not linked to a set programme within the department, although a training needs analysis had reportedly been done. In October of 1996, more staff joined the HRD section, and the section undertook an informal needs analysis in Head Office for the first time. There was no budget for this exercise though, and staff of the section went around the department talking to managers, and running workshops to identify needs. The HRD section got involved in implementing the South African Schools Act around 96 and 97, particularly activities around school governing bodies. The emphasis at this stage was still on developing schools and educators, rather than staff at the Bisho office. The HRD section had a variety of initiatives including planning assisted by ITEC, where the section developed a vision and mission. It kept being diverted away from HRD in the Bisho office though, as
urgent needs arose within the department which were delegated to the staff in this section to handle. Budget frustrations in 1997 caused the good work of needs analysis and planning done in late 1996 to be halted at the implementation stage.

HRD was new to the public sector at this stage, and there was little understanding at head office that it meant more than just uncoordinated training. Staff who had taken study-leave and gone for training on their own initiative, very often left the DOE to take up other posts soon after completing the training. To this day the section has trouble ensuring its focus is not diverted to whatever crisis requires attention in the DOE. One respondent referred to the section as the receiving all the 'left-overs' of work urgently needing attention. They have however been able to engage in better coordination and staff development activities since 1997, which some attribute to the intervention of Imbewu.

5.5 Operating systems

The operating systems of the directorate were created out of an array of different systems that were practiced in the various outgoing departments of education. The fact that these practices continued to operate ensuring that functions continued to be performed, also allowed for newly absorbed staff to become acquainted with the operating practices of the outgoing departments. This comparing of notes set the tone for the new emerging systems, which instead of embracing new progressive approaches to Human Resource Management, only distilled a set of operating practices from a set of departments that were not designed to serve the needs of a united province.

5.5.1 Salaries

Salary scales for the six different departments were luckily standardised by 1994, leaving only qualifications to be checked to ensure correct salaries for absorbed staff. However during the years building up to 1994, practices in the homeland personnel sections had been particularly irresponsible, and numerous staff were promoted incorrectly. After 1994 when these staff who had received salary increases were absorbed, investigations exposed the incorrect promotions (around early 1996). These staff were then asked to pay back the money they had been "overpaid" during this period. In some cases the amounts are still outstanding, and as union representatives noted, some individuals still owe as much as R8 000 to the DOE. While the salary scales may have been the same, the implementation of the system had been manipulated by some of the outgoing departments, apparently because they feared they would be demoted when absorbed into the new DOE after 1994. This kind of irresponsible behaviour seems to have been frequent as organs of the apartheid state saw that the democratic transition was inevitable, and fell into a state of panic.

The White and Broudy commissions of the time reportedly hit some Nehawu members hard. The judicial commissions looked into administration in the old Transkei (promotions etc), and some staff who had been incorrectly promoted, were demoted. The union felt that this negatively affected members, that senior staff had promoted them, and they could not refuse. Other sources from within the department indicate that some officials from the homeland regimes had promoted themselves, which is a different matter from being promoted by someone senior who could not be refused.
While the salaries may have been the same in the former homeland and CPA areas, taxes were vastly different, effecting take-home pay. Sadtu was involved in a national process for harmonizing tax for teachers (Ciskei and Transkei were different), subsidies etc. These kinds of issues were handled with the national education department, who sent teams down to the province, and local task teams were also introduced to deal with matters of harmonisation.

5.5.2 The Voluntary Severance Package

Many respondents felt that the wrong people took the package, and it resulted in lost expertise. It appears that where the VSP cleared out some of the higher positions, unions were hoping to see their members move up into the vacant positions. This expectation was not always met.

The second MEC for education complained that the VSP had a terrible impact on the department, as they needed people with experience to teach them how to run the system. The VSP was set up so that the number of years of service of the official determined the payout. Longstanding and skilled personnel who were able to move into private sector opportunities, did so with a large payout from government. The Director General had set up the process for implementation in the DOE, but it was apparently not well co-ordinated, and there was insufficient consultation (especially with teachers).

5.5.3 Recruitment of staff

Recruitment procedure during this period used the standard advertising and interviewing process, but some respondents felt that the best people did not get the posts because of trade-offs with the unions. Given that an enormous number of staff were absorbed from the outgoing departments of education, recruiting new staff into an already bloated system would obviously be tricky. Indeed the union representatives interviewed did complain about staff being labelled as supernumeraries and sitting in their jobs with no skills or attempts at human resource development and training being made by management, while the newspapers were flooded with adverts for posts which outsiders applied for. When recruiting staff there should have been an effort to strike a balance been absorbing people and expecting them to adapt and develop their skills for a new department, and buying in the required skills from outside, thereby avoiding entrenched work practices and attitudes.

According to another respondent in the Human Resources section during this period, the process for filling of posts in 1996 led to the DOE loosing court cases even today. According to the respondent people were appointed chaotically. Up to senior officer there was absorption and the posts were also advertised which led to duplication, with more people that posts.

National government had a rollout plan for the new structure, and the number of posts were calculated per province, with quota’s for positions based on populations (so many directors, HOD’s etc). People were recruited into the new structure, with senior people reapplying for their posts. Many top people who had not previously been civil servants were brought in (e.g. academics). Some respondents reported
that they needed to strike a balance between employing teachers and administrators, and they favored teachers instead. This reportedly impacted on projects negatively.

Recruitment was not only hampered by issues of excess staff not being properly placed, but also by financial management issues. For example the failed attempt to appoint four hundred subject advisers was a case-in-point. In 1996 the posts were advertised, and applications received, once the Finance Directorate had approved the funds. The restructuring process that was also occurring at this time left staff feeling uncertain about their future employment, and people started raising the alarm about the cost of employing four hundred new subject advisers, whereupon the process was frozen. According to SADTU these advisers had been promised their jobs, and had to work on contract for a period under the impression that their jobs would be confirmed. This never happened, according to Union respondents.

The employment process should have been an opportunity for political leaders to assemble a team of bureaucrats to implement the new education vision. This proved difficult, as MEC's had limited access to the employment process. There were issues with who took orders from who (MEC or Director General), and it was not clear who had the last word. The relationship between the executive and the administration was confusing, so in some situations the administrators let the MEC participate, in other situations they did not. There was a lack of consistency as regulations were not clear. Some suspicion surrounded the employment process, the Adonis report unearthed perceptions within the districts that head office was practicing nepotism in its appointments (iv).

Bureaucrats from the apartheid departments were expected to guide the new political leadership in the running and managing the new DOE. As an outside policy analyst remarked "some ANC activists were not trained in administration and were swamped by the old guard administrators who knew what they were doing. In retrospect the incremental peace-meal approach was not the correct one. What was probably required was strong intervention to suspend the system. While bureaucrats from the old apartheid system may not have had a political agenda, they simply acted on past experience and through habit, which entrenched the past into the new system."

One respondent held a more favourable view of the relationship between staff coming into the new DOE from the old structures and newer staff, pointing out that people had been scared that they would loose their jobs, and when they did not, a sense of harmony was created. He felt that the only staff conflicts were around attitudes.

The movement of staff from the 6 outgoing departments onto the new organogram of the DOE approved in 1995, was never properly completed. To complicate matters, skills of staff being absorbed differed. For example the clerical level were taken from the Ciskei administration, and they had low skills levels, with basic literacy low, and a lack of computer literacy according to a senior official who joined the DOE later.

The recruitment of staff should have been an opportunity to break the perception of public servant career paths being based on time served, rather than performance. By way of example, the Commonwealth Strategies for Reform 1995 points out that senior positions in countries such as New Zealand and Australia have changed from being low reward, high security positions to become exactly the opposite (1995:40).

5.5.4 Staff size
All staff were absorbed from the outgoing departments of education. As the Human Resources Director points out “the excess staff are still with the DOE, none were shed”. He quotes the example of the Ciskei administration, where thousands of civil servants had been discharged after going on strike in 1992. These people were then replaced, but when the new DOE was formed in 1995, both the replacements and the discharged staff were absorbed. This led to ‘double-parking’ in jobs, and nobody was demoted or retrenched. Nehawu confirmed that 3 000 of their members had been discharged by the Ciskei government, and most had been reabsorbed into the DOE in 1995.

The extent to which the staff size was overblown during the period 1994 to 1997, is difficult to calculate. Respondents point out the huge service delivery mandate given to the dept in 1994, and the vast size of the province to motivate for no retrenchments. The unions accepted natural attrition and the VSP as ways of reducing the staff size in Bisho, but the moratorium on retrenchments has extended beyond its initial five-year timeframe. Nehawu holds the position that once rationalisation is complete, retrenchments can be considered. They also hold that those without skills must be retrained. In 1998 an agreement was made with government on a personnel skills audit and service delivery assessment. Public servant supernumeraries' numbers have been speculated by numerous political leaders, but never settled upon. The issue of staff size and supernumeraries has been in limbo since 1994, and contributed to the uncertainty and instability within the DOE, and also undermined government’s credibility in managing the government machinery.

5.5.5 Labour relations

Unions were very active during this period. The relationship between the unions and management seems to have been dictated by national policy and bargaining processes which were shaping the labour relations regime outside of Bisho. A somewhat uneasy relationship between management and the unions existed, with wider arena’s bringing the two together in a structured relationship. The apartheid departments of education had excluded unions entirely from their operations, leaving inherited senior managers unsure of the new relationship.

Nehawu reported that they were represented on the SMT’s, but that many departments did not seem happy with their participation. They charge that departments realised structures would give Nehawu leverage, so some departments pulled out of structures which then collapsed. Unions started representing their members interests more and more after 1994, creating a more normalized relationship between management and staff in line with the international experience. For political leadership this was a different experience though, as unions had assisted the ANC in the elections as an exercise of ensuring the transfer of power in the country.

5.5.6 Job descriptions, work plans and performance management

The previous job descriptions contained in the staff code from the outgoing departments were kept in place from 1994, and were not properly reviewed. Respondents felt that staff did not understand the new organogram, and were not clear on their responsibilities due to the instability of the department. To compound
poor management practices, no workplans were ever drawn up for staff between 1994 and 1997. In addition, there was no performance management system put in place, even to this day none has been introduced. There are still no performance contracts for senior staff. Only recent legislation and policy on human resources and management practices within government has introduced these notions. Clearly staff had little guidance in the difficult period of 1994 to 1997. In addition poor performance was almost impossible to confront outside a proper human resource management system. Attitudes from inherited staff opposed to transformation were difficult to confront. The attitude reportedly was worst in certain regions, for example the Transkei, Umtata office, which opposed transformation and became a launching pad for opposition.

5.5.7 Staff development

Many respondents complained about a lack of staff development in this period. The extent of staff development during this period seems to have been activities like workshops to capacitate new managers on labour relations, conflict resolution, negotiations training, disciplinary procedure etc. These examples apply only to staff development within the Human Resources directorate. This directorate should be servicing the entire DOE in Bisho, but seems to have had an inward focus during this period. This is perhaps due to its own internal requirements that needed urgent attention.

The approach to staff development from 1994 was that weaknesses in the dept were analysed, and recurrent problems identified to be addressed in a crisis-management style. In other words when serious problems emerged, often repeatedly, the need to address them was realized. This Human Resources approach seems very reactive. Training does not appear to have been driven by requests, with no requests reported from individuals within the HR section.

From the union perspective, the Nehawu respondent pointed out that very little staff development occurred in the DOE during this period, despite the fact that they saw staff development as a key issue. As the respondent put it: "a two-day course means nothing. Training to know your job is not enough. Training was not focused on skills, or increasing the efficiency of the department". The MEC at the time admitted that no staff development really happened although there was plenty required. Only on-the-job training was done.

Staff were restless about the slow appointments process. Staff from outlying areas also had to move home to come and live in Bisho, and they complained about disrupting their families. There were no staff development structures in place. According to the MEC, the Human Resources section was not operating properly at the time. The Adonisi report noted the unhappiness within the regions at the lack of staff development and training (1999: 15). The report noted allegations from regions and districts that the Department had no particular process to determine the relationship between human resource needs and programme objectives. "Because of the territorial mentality... roles and responsibilities of staff are not clearly defined. The limited human resources are expected to carry out responsibilities beyond their expertise and consequently some essential tasks are not being performed." (1999: 33)
While Human Resource Development was seen by the unions as the solution to the problem of excess staff and a lack of delivery, the Human Resources section was unable to meet the challenge it faced. It is unlikely that unions will accept a performance management system being put in place without staff development to address weaknesses in job performance.

5.5.8 Qualifications

On paper qualifications of staff within the department were mostly adequate, but respondents reported that skills were lacking. Nonetheless no skills audit or needs analysis was ever done in the department from 1994 to 1997.

Many respondents interviewed reflected on the department’s tendency to employ teachers in administrative and management positions in the new DOE staffed in 1995. Some respondents felt that teachers could not be taken out of the classroom and be expected to be project managers. The second MEC for education does not share this contention that a bias towards hiring teachers at head office existed. Those who were teachers themselves tend to think this argument around the suitability of teachers for management posts is misguided. It is probably a symptom of rivalry between career civil servants and those who see themselves as educators.

The more recent approaches to human resource management has seen significant changes in policy, such as those around performance management. The Commonwealth Strategies for Reform book ‘Managing the public service notes “Reform programmes are demarcating the political/administrative boundary more clearly. Authority is explicitly delegated to senior officials in exchange for accountability for performance. Monitoring is achieved through performance agreements and the specification of expectations within short-term contracts for staff at senior levels to provide the basis for ministerial review of achievements.” (1995: p32). Malta and Botswana are mentioned as examples. This is increasingly the direction in which the South African public service is moving at all levels, be it national, provincial or local government.

5.6 Indicators

- No strategic human resource plan
- No review of job descriptions and work plans
- No performance management system being implemented
- Insufficient monitoring of staff performance
- Insufficient career-pathing for DOE staff
- No HRD structures in place, little HRD planning occurring (no needs analysis done)
- No performance contracts for senior managers
- Work programmes (to help managers manage staff) not being produced on a regular basis
- 1995 and 1997 organograms not properly filled
- Uneasy relationship between management and trade unions
- Limited training happening (mostly just on-the-job training)
- Supernumeraries an unresolved issue (no commonly agreed upon sense of ideal staff size)
- Not all staff on common Persal system (but most were on the system by 1997)
6. FINANCE

6.1 Introductory comment

Finance within the Department of Education during the period 1994 to 1997 was in a state of crisis, one of the worst areas of the department's performance, it impacted on the entire functioning of the department negatively. The systems for budgeting and financial management within the province can be pinpointed as a major part of the problem, and these systems have subsequently changed. While all departments in Bisho would have had similar difficulties with changing to a new finance system for the province, the DOE was handling large sums of money, making the financial crisis more visible.

An outside policy analyst observed that the system was not set up to manage expenditure, that there were no instruments to enable intervention of resources. The reconfiguration of the state saw government trying to put different resources through the same system.

This section looks at financial management, decentralization, funding, budgeting, debt, cash flow and accounting issues (including irregularities). Finally some broad indicators are suggested, flowing from this analysis.

6.2 Financial Management

The departments of Welfare and Education were the provinces’ biggest worry during the period under review, taking a large portion of the provincial budget. The rule of thumb at this time was that 85% of the provincial budget should go to health, welfare and education. By the middle of 1997 the MEC for Finance had to freeze the budget of the DOE. At this time real demands were being made on the department, with requests coming in for funding for classrooms and stationary. MPL's would read in the newspaper about the DOE handing out funds in one area (like building a school), while other debts had not been paid, or vital materials bought. At this stage the MEC for Finance had to take over and halt building projects, sometimes halfway through. The bank overdraft at this time was paralysing the DOE, and departmental cheques were bouncing regularly. Proper financial systems were not in place in the department at this time, the officials responsible could not relate what was in the kitty with what was needed out in the schools. The perception that government had endless funds prevailed.

Senior managers in the DOE were held accountable for the failure of the department to honour its financial commitments. Managers were taken to court, assets of the department were seized, and budgets for sections frozen mid-way through the year. This kind of activity made the financial crisis painfully obvious not only to senior staff, but all members of the department. The effect of this clear financial crisis, combined with the uncertainties of restructuring the department not once but twice, would have affected staff morale significantly.

As the second MEC for education noted, it was only in 1996/97 that the budget was properly consolidated, the budgets before then belonged to the past. The MEC was given different pictures on finance from different people up to this time, limiting her
ability to gain control over the crisis and intervene where necessary. It was only with the consolidated budget that the extent of the problem become evident.

There was dual responsibility in this period as strategic managers controlled expenditure, while the old HOD's were still signing the cheques. This lack of clarity on final responsibility for financial management was a recipe for problems. It resulted in cash-flow problems, and a lack of records, for example there were no assets registers in the DOE. Staff received very little training on financial management, and although some had been managers previously, for example in the Transkei, they simply did not have the capacity to manage in the new DOE.

6.3 Decentralisation

The department was responsible for a sector with massive backlogs and urgent needs, with frequent and pressing requests being directed at head office. When demands were made on the DOE for activities like building classrooms, they simply handed money out, even when there were no funds left in the bank account. Problems emerged as a result of this, for example contractors were not paid. In 1997 the department was at the equivalent stage of liquidation, it was basically bankrupt. It was it this point that the MEC for Finance intervened and took over the financial management of the department. Centralisation of finance within the province occurred after 1997, as a result of such problems in the DOE and other key departments.

Much of the financial management problems in the department have been attributed to the use of manual systems and a lack of infrastructure which hampered communication and co-ordination between regions and head office. Money spent in a region would be recorded by hand into a file. These kinds of infrastructure and technology problems were an obstacle to proper financial management. Everything took longer to do and cost more money in the province, due to underdevelopment. An example used by a respondent was an activity like calling a meeting, which could not be done by phone or fax. People would have to drive for two hours to a place just to set-up a meeting. There was a lack of co-ordination and accountability on financial matters, and,there was unequal utilisation of resources. Some regional directors overspent, accountability from and between the regions was a problem, as they did not consult each other. This context explains the problems of monitoring the use of funds in a decentralized structure. Solving such problems within a decentralized system would require injections of capital into the communications infrastructure of the province. After 1997 the financial system of the province changed, and financial management was recentralised to Head Office. This seems to have alleviated some of the difficulties with monitoring funds.

The MEC for Finance at the time explained that during the 1994 to 1997 period the DOE had rollovers only theoretically (i.e. only on paper). The system for monitoring expenditure was manual and not-up-to-date, so records would come in late, after money had been spent. Rollovers were then recorded centrally, when the money had already been spent out in a region, where a file existed at regional level that had not yet been factored in. The evidence of rollovers negatively affected the department's image, as it created the perception that money was available while assets were being attached by the court. Subsequent changes in the finance system have ensured that rollovers result in penalties to the department responsible. No such penalties or sanctions existed from 1994 to 1997.
In times of uncertainty when there is a need for harsh fiscal discipline in line with GEAR, the logical response is to centralise and gain a tight hold on the use for resources. The capacity for proper financial management at both district and head office level was clearly absent in the DOE. In many ways decentralization was a luxury the DOE could not afford in the context of trying to forge a single new provincial department out of six apartheid education administrations. While this subsequent centralization from 1997 onward may not encourage democratic decentralization, it is a reasonable response to an obvious crisis in the province. The Adonis report uncovered a tension between regional/district level and head office in Bisho regarding the recentralisation of finance in 1997 (1999:18). Motivations for decentralization emerging from the Adonis survey fly in the face of the serious financial control problems which landed the DOE in crisis by 1997, and should be viewed with caution.

6.4 Funding

Provinces have no taxing powers, and generate limited funds for themselves. Thus the budget for the province comes directly from the national government in a lump sum. It is the National Finance Ministry that does the budget for the country, first taking off all the money for debt servicing. What is left after this, is divided vertically between the national departments and the provinces. After the money is divided horizontally between provinces, it is entirely up to them how they divide it internally. Therefore there is no direct funding relationship between the National Ministry for Education, and the provincial DOE. The relationship is defined more on a policy level.

The DOE did also get RDP funds during this period, which were used for projects like the building of schools. These funds came directly from the national RDP office, so the provincial department of Finance was not responsible for monitoring how it was spent. The RDP office nationally had a discretionary fund which departments could access after prioritising their projects. The Eastern Cape DOE prioritised the building of toilets at schools, especially in the former homeland areas. Funds were managed by the national RDP office, and sent directly to the DOE nationally, and then down to the provincial DOE. (i.e. not through provincial RDP office.) The departments would submit business plans, often prepared by consultants, which left the DOE unable to project manage very well as they had not prepared the business plans themselves.

During the 1994 –1997 period funds in the budget for the DOE only increased from year to year by a small percentage, indicative of the breaks being applied to social spending in line with the country’s macroeconomic policy (GEAR).

6.5 Budgeting Process

Once the total envelope for the province had been determined, the process of breaking it down would begin. Budgeting within the province was historically based, and not needs based as the MEC for Finance at the time explained. Previously committed funds for running projects could not be ignored when planning for the next financial year. This made it difficult to start new projects, as old projects were still being serviced. For example in the western half of the province schools had transport and electricity for their pupils, while the eastern half did not have the benefit of this. In 1994 when the government changed, and funds were scarce, these advantages were not taken away from the western half of the province, as politicians felt that they could not undermine these areas. The budget continued to go more to the west of the
province than the east as a result of this. This carry-over from the past, with funds already limited, left very little room for manoeuvre. The total envelope for each year was not increasing at the same rate as the demands on the ground.

This apparent inability to redirect expenditure to previously disadvantaged areas was most unfortunate, and resulted in little visible change in delivery following the change in government. Changing this pattern of expenditure later would also prove difficult, as the incremental approach to budgeting only entrenched past practices. As one senior official from the province put it, "all in all the DOE had consumption budgets, there was little development." There are better ways of budgeting. In Singapore for example, the government undertakes zero-based reviews of public sector structures and costs every five years, emphasising a culture of realism by focusing on what is to be done rather than what has already been achieved (Commonwealth Strategies for Reform 1995: 47).

The budgeting process was not very inclusive of DOE staff, teachers or stakeholders. The vote would be announced, and then the Administrative Support Services Branch would allocate funds to the directorates. Only in 1997 and 1998 did the different sections get more involved in internal budgeting. After 1997 financial management legislation was introduced which enforced broader participation in budgeting within departments. This introduced the possibility of moving from a historically-based incremental budget, to a forward thinking, planned, developmental budget.

In terms of how the budgeting process did involve the departments and their officials in a limited way, the departments would make requests to Treasury formulated along the guidelines the cabinet would give out. The Cabinet committee would then look at provincial priorities, and take decisions collectively. The funds needed in the Eastern Cape were greater than in other provinces, given its position as one of the poorest provinces in the country. After health, education and welfare took 85% of the budget, only 15% was left for the other departments to share. The allocation to the DOE was not based on its ability to manage funds effectively, but rather on the importance of education needs in the province.

In addition to problems caused by the decentralized finance system, the enormous backlogs inherited in 1994 were a major problem for the province, as the formula for dividing funds between provinces did not take backlogs into account at this time. The formula was based mostly on population size, and to some extent how rural the province was. This had a devastating effect on the Eastern Cape, as it allowed provinces with better infrastructure and lower backlogs to progress, while the Eastern Cape fell behind, unable to make progress in fighting the backlogs. This denial of the inherited problems of a province with two former homelands has led to a context where the divide between the more advantaged provinces and those with historical backlogs has widened. The FFC have now developed a better formula, which takes more account of backlogs, but is has not yet been implemented. The damage done over the first five years is difficult to calculate.

### 6.6 Budget Analysis

The first consolidated budget for the DOE that was not a composite of carried-over budgets from the outgoing departments was formulated in 1997. This gives a sense of how the transition to a fully functional DOE for the province was delayed and drawn-out over 3 years.
Many respondents reported that within the DOE 90% of the budget went to salaries during this period. This is a fixed cost, not seen as a capital cost. But as the MEC at the time pointed out, teachers are human capital, so this percentage will always be high. It should ideally be lower though, around 85%. This still leaves very little money for infrastructure provision and maintenance. Union representatives reported being held to ransom by this high percentage of expenditure on salaries. All government departments in the Eastern Cape tend to suffer from a large wage bill which limits funds for addressing backlogs and maintaining existing infrastructure which is in a state of decline in many parts of the province.

The policy speech for 1995/96 laments the lack of funds left over after recurrent expenditure, for capital expenditure. "The analysis above has left my department with one thousand five million rand to see to the capital projects such as building and renovation of classrooms. With the backlog in classroom building of more than one billion rand this amount is only a drop in the ocean" (1995/96 policy speech, p31). The budget for 1996/97 totalled R5 024 734 000 according to the annual report for this year. A comparison of the previous financial year (95/96) indicates an increase in current expenditure of R582 212 000, but a decrease in capital expenditure of R78 282 000. While the total budget for the period had increased from 95/96 figure of R4 499 850 000 to the 96/97 R5 024 734 000, the areas of expenditure had clearly shifted in certain areas. A large increase in administrative costs (from 70 166 000 in 95/96, to 383 176 000 in 96/97) probably flows from appointment of staff to head office during this period. The decrease in spending on private ordinary school education in this period, does indicate some re-orientation of expenditure away from historically advantaged schools. A large increase in spending on Technical college education (from 17 944 000 in 95/96, to 108 243 000 in 96/97) also indicates redirection of resources to priority areas, and is a small victory for the DOE.

The 96/97 annual report noted that the VSP has cost the DOE an estimated R200 million by the end of 1996, with 1 453 applications for VSP received (educators and non educators, p18). This and rising staff costs as unions ensured better pay for their membership, put further pressure on departmental recurrent expenditure.

6.7 Debt

During the period 1994 to 1997 the provincial government operated each financial year as if it were a clean slate, not carrying debts over into the following year's budget. By 1998 the DOE owed millions, builders, publishers etc were not being paid. The DOE also picked up old debts from the six previous departments of education, debts to Telkom, Eskom etc. This only started turning around in 1998, when the former MEC for Finance took over the financial management of the department and started budgeting new money for servicing old debts.

At first the legislature were not sympathetic to departments being weighed down by old debt. The legislature system demands that new budgets must be spent for new delivery, this is why the crisis had compounded itself during this period. This is still an issue for the legislature. It is evident that when no funds were being provided to the province for inherited backlogs, the province was apprehensive about servicing debt carried over from year to year beyond 1994, as delivery would have had to suffered further. After debts of the DOE were calculated, only about 20% of the total financial years budget would be left for new expenditure during this period.
Problems with RDP schools-building contracts being halted during this period have also been attributed to deficiencies within the Tender Board and the Public Works Department who impacted on the choice of contractors. A senior official from the DOE pointed out that there was no clear picture of finances within the department for many years. There was a financial crash in 1997 where the province overspent by R1 Billion. Education was seen as a key culprit of the crash, and all departments suffered, some debts are still being carried.

6.8 Cash-flow problems

The SADTU respondent told of how in 1995 and 1996 it was very difficult for teachers to get paid, and cheques were written by hand. The DOE is now demanding money back for overpayment during this period. Teachers were aware of the financial crisis in the department, especially when the union had to demand teachers salaries be paid. Files were being lost during this period, and accusations of inefficiency were a problem in the DOE. The bad records of the DOE affected employees, some staff had their houses repossessed after their salaries were not paid, and other assets were attached. The union has had to take legal action against the DOE which is still underway. Between 1994 and 1997 the unions told people about the teething problems of the department, and members were more understanding. Members slowly lost patience as they witnessed resources being wasted in the DOE, which sometimes came out in the media.

The Nehawu respondent explained that from the officials’ side the financial problems in the DOE affected staff, for example they would be told that there was no paper, pens, toilet paper, petrol etc. This affected service delivery and there was no participation in the budget process during this period, so the problems seemed remote and beyond the control of staff. This created a lack of responsibility within the department.

Problems with the education budget in this period were serious, and while the different programmes were given a budget at the beginning of the financial year, that money was later poached, and people were asked not to spend their budget. This created problems, for example people providing transport (taxi people) who had provided services to the sections programmes, could not be paid. This soured the relationship between many stakeholders and the department, and service providers will be hesitance to work with the DOE again.

6.9 Accounting, filing and irregularities

The accounting systems in the DOE during this period were not performing, partly due to the decentralization of budgets to regions as already outlined, and the use of differing and manual accounting systems inherited from the six outgoing departments of education. Only recently has a single set of systems been introduced to the DOE, and it has not been completely implemented yet.

Treasury was also not centralised as it is now. Permanent secretaries in their departments were accounting officers at the time. At that stage government was not using Generally Accepted Accounting Practice yet. Only recently has legislation governing financial management in government made it mandatory for GAAP to be used. This ensures a common accounting system which has been used in the private
sector for many years. All levels of government are now legally required to comply with the principles of GAAP.

Standing committee reports from 1997 reflect persistent problems within the DOE, such as certain staff having 2 Persal numbers (i.e. collecting 2 salaries), and this being under investigation. The moving of staff off the six different salary systems onto the common Persal system did result in payment problems. The exercise was however, a mammoth task which was finally achieved in 1997. Outstanding audit queries in 1997 amounted to 78, of which only two had been fully replied to. "The arrival of these queries coincided with the transfer of files from the ex Head Offices to the Regions. Some of the audit queries are still outstanding due to missing files and vouchers as these queries are dating back as far as 1994." (p 11, 18 Sept 1997).

The MEC at the time felt that nobody really benefited from the financial crisis, but there is evidence of serious fraud and corruption within the DOE. The Standing Committee Report of 1997 talks of one hundred cases being investigated and the amount of money involved R1 272 000.00. Cases were being reported to the Police and the Legal Section was formulating charges against the Deputy Director and Assistant Director for Salaries at the time (p12). Problems with duplicate salary cheques being printed and police investigations launched pepper this report. The bank reconciliation's were not done for the period April to August 1997 mainly because there were no officials trained to do bank reconciliation's on FMS (p12-13).

It is not surprising that irregularities in the new DOE would become a problem, when it inherited six apartheid education administrations, as well as staff who feared for their own financial stability and employment.

6.10 Indicators

- No integrated planning and budgeting cycle which looks forward rather than backward
- Recentralisation of finance with the MEC for Finance running the DOE's finance
- Persal and FMS systems not standardized across the DoE (although moves in this direction had begun)
- Insufficient training and testing of staff on their ability to use new systems
- Insufficient participation in budgeting
- Insufficient understanding of roles and responsibilities with respect to the financial management of resources
- Allocations to the province and DOE not taking sufficiently taking backlogs into account
- Debts of the DOE starting to be serviced
- Accounting irregularities and filing problems
- Resources starting to be redirected to new programme priorities
7. ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

7.1 Introductory comments

"Reforming the public service does not stop at restructuring the organisational environment within which public servants operate. Strategies for reform must ensure that public servants are self-motivated by a new set of values and assumptions, and most crucially that their own aspirations coincide with organisational goals." (Commonwealth Strategies for Reform 1995: 34)

Many factors influenced the organisational culture of the department during the period under review. The radical transformation of the department both in form as well as content affected the morale of the persons working at the time. Job security, remuneration and promotions were all being affected by criteria that were not fully understood and accepted by all the personnel of the department. This was a result of forces that were not entirely under the control of the department.

The culture of the civil service at the time reflected the organisational background of the of the people working within. This was not a homogeneous group of happy workers. They were a forced grouping suspicious of each other that did not share a common history or vision for the future. They held opposing views of how the department was to be run as they had indeed come from opposing sides of the education system.

This stratified the department internally. The first division was along those that came from within the civil service and those that came from outside the formal civil service. Those from the former administration were further divided amongst themselves between those that came from the three different regions that made up the province. The new entrees into the civil service also had political and organisational differences amongst themselves representing their different political organisations and allegiances. All of these groups had their own baggage that they brought into the civil service which haunted the attainment of a common positive organisational culture.

This section firstly looks at the different groups of people that came to work in the new provincial administration and the basis of the culture that they brought with them. Other factors that contributed to the organisational culture such as the physical location of the living and working environment of the provincial administration and the role of trade unions are also reflected upon.

7.2 The Formal Civil Servants

The nature of the formal civil service at the time was that officials moved amongst the government departments wherever opportunities for personnel advancement arose. There was not much movement in and out of the departments to the private sector or NGO and most of the movement was internal. Benefits were structured in such a way that continued unbroken service yielded good returns for those that could stay until retirement. The civil service was more than a job, it was a career. It offered jobs and secure ones at that in areas where non else were to be found.
Prior to 1994 the government was obsessed with controlling and structuring the living and working environment in order to maintain relations in society for the continuance of the racist and oppressive state. The civil service was its implementers. Every thing from social benefits to the provision of services were racially structured and tightly controlled. State security apparatus had a particular interest in black education. This was the breeding ground for thinking and critical young blacks that opposed the government. The bureaucrat that worked in the administration was rarely required to think or relate to the public in positive manner. Policies were strong and directives were to be followed without question.

Not all the former formal civil servants however were the same. There were differences between the ex South African Government employees and those that worked in the homelands. Those that worked for the former South African government had slightly higher levels of skills, were better equipped to be able to perform their tasks and enjoyed better living and working conditions. Those that worked in the former homelands worked under poor conditions and did not have access to skills and opportunities that allowed them to grow as individuals and deliver a good service to the public.

The employees of the former administration brought with them administrative skills. They had been working and studying public administration for many years. They understood the machinery of the bureaucracy. The civil servants of the former Bantustan administration had worked at very high levels of the administration and this gave them an added area of experience compared to those that had worked for the South African government. The former Bantustan administrators understood and could relate to the interplay between the political and administrative arms of government. They could steer and translate political objectives into administrative policies having worked close to politicians in the past.

Civil servants that were employed in the homeland administration had joined the government when no other employment was available and the civil service provided a stable job. A loyal servant of the political master was richly rewarded under these conditions and one could rise above ones peers in the community by working hard at being a good state functionary. These civil servants brought into the new administration relatively good management and technical skills compared to those that came from outside the formal civil service.

The former civil servants of the governments of the day were not cultivated as free thinkers and deliveries of services in the manner they thought best serving the publics interest. The orders came from above and were to be executed without question or reason. Command and control were the management style of the day. Management was not through objectives and performance was measured to the extent that instructions were carried out.

The junior personnel had expectations of improved conditions of employment and advancement opportunities. At last higher positions in the service were attainable and not the exclusive privilege of whites in the former South Africa and political lackeys of homeland leaders in the Bantustan. There was an expectation of fairness and equality when promotions were to be considered.

The senior personnel were afraid of losing their jobs on the other hand. All management positions were advertised and some had to apply for what they believed to be their posts. Carrying out their tasks under their previous government
positioned them opposite the political leaders now in power. The future was not secure any more and everything had to be done to ensure a better future even if this meant leaving the service.

7.3 The Non Formal Civil Servants

The overhaul of the civil service started from the top with newly elected political leadership appointing senior managers. The politicians who came into power wanted their own trusted comrades heading, leading and filling the departmental structures. This led to the appointment of persons from previously outside government who had served their communities in a totally different manner. For the education department this meant drawing on educationists who up until now had worked in organisations that presented an alternate view to that being put forward by the state at the time. These were carders of the Mass Democratic Movement, exiles and liberation fighters who at last could work openly in uplifting the conditions for the country's population. Many saw their employment as deployment reflecting the culture that this brought into the service.

Participatory democracies were the organisational principles that guided their former work environments and flat management structures where they were accountable to committees and forums made it difficult to work for a boss or supervisor as was required in the service. The activist could not fit comfortably into the role of government functionary easily. Although the passion for wanting to serve was there, the conditions under which these were to be performed were restrictive to the new recruit into government service.

The non formal civil servants were strong on understanding the relevance of new and emerging policy given their histories. These civil servants had a strategic sense which sometimes went as far as challenging their superiors. Those coming from the mass democratic movement were not trained in following orders but were good at questioning the political and established order.

Political appointments were only made at the senior and managerial positions. These political appointees being in senior positions had personnel and programme responsibilities which had to be performed within existing frameworks. The rules of the service however were of the old. The staff codes were the old procedures. A situation arose where the subordinate knew his or her way around the bureaucracy better than the superior who had recently joined the service. In many instances they came from different political persuasions and this added to the poor working relations.

7.4 Living and Working in Bisho

The location of the provincial headquarters at Bisho, the former Ciskei administration capital, and the undertaking by the government not to retrench meant that the provincial administration was filled with Ciskei civil servants already occupying the physical space that was to be taken up by the new administration. These civil servants had established their homes here. For the rest, Bisho as a place to live and work was not attractive and consequently it attracted few from outside who could not commute daily to work. Those that were from the Port Elizabeth region for example were not attracted by the prospect of moving to Bisho as it did not offer a stimulating working and living environment and most senior officials would live in East London.
and commute daily to work. King Williams Town being the closest was a small town offering limited access to modern amenities and work opportunities for the families of those employed by the government. Thus the head office was only able to attract previous serving officials from more economically depressed areas.

Compounding this was the working environment in Bisho which was also not very encouraging. These were not modern offices but a former Bantustan administration. The buildings themselves were poorly designed and a hazard to work in. In an emergency they could become a death trap as there were no escape routes for quick evacuation of the building. Ventilation and lighting was poor making the offices claustrophobic. Infrastructure was poor with no access to computer networks. The telephone system was particularly poor and getting stuck in the lift could mean staying there until a technician arrived from East London.

7.5 Confusing Lines of Authority

The relationship between the department and the ministry was tense. This was as a result of the confusing lines of authority and accountability. Administratively the department was accountable to the director general but the MEC had to account to the provincial legislature and account for what his or her department was doing. The new recruits into the department continued to be political activists whilst employed by the government. Their political histories, organisational accountability and personal networks some times went above and beyond their immediate political heads of the department. Officials in the department held political positions in the party structures where they would interact and report on government's performance. This created tensions in the departments as administratively lower employed were reporting to higher political authorities in political organisations.

The position of the head of department also had a confusing level of authority. The roles of the provincial director general, the MEC and programme heads at the national department in Pretoria were not clearly identified.

7.6 Trade Unions and Organisational Culture.

Organised worker representatives adopted a very conciliatory and accommodating attitude towards their members' employers during the initial establishment of the departments. This led to a positive organisational culture that assisted the formation of the department. The trade unions could not however hold this position for long.

In 1995 civil servants embarked on a strike when the new administration was not able to bring about improvements to working conditions as fast workers would have liked. The salary increments being offered by the government were just not enough to encourage civil servants to go on working.

SADTU initially discouraged people from taking the VSP and encouraged their members to build the new administration. This however changed in 1996 when the union adopted a resolution that allowed its members to take the voluntary severance package if they wished to. The union began to say that teachers were workers to and their interest as workers needed to be catered for as well as the interest of the new administration.
Poor administration within the department was beginning to affect union members. Hand cheques led to some people getting overpaid whilst others did not get their monies due to them. The application of the voluntary severance package was being discussed in the legislature as opposition parties berated the MEC complaining that teachers who had applied to leave the service were now facing financial problems as they had been released and not received their pay out.

A common payroll in the form of Persal was introduced in 1996/97 and was the first time that this was introduced to the former employees of Ciskei and Transkei. This brought with it the equalisation of pay for all those in the service and loaded the homeland civil servants onto the South African Tax system. This had serious tax implications for those employed by the homeland administrations as their tax increased to over 40% from being as low as 26%. This instant jump created hardships for many families who were unable to meet their commitments.

At the level of the schools the governing bodies now were in control of the employment of teachers. The school governing bodies chaired the employment of teachers. This was a new development and teachers were having to account to the communities directly for the first time.

As the problems deepened the divides widened with civil servants relying on old networks to protect their interests. People built little kingdoms around them selves to protect their own interests and those that they had worked with before and could trust.

**7.7 Conclusion**

The organisational culture during the period under review progressively declined and the initial euphoria surrounding working for a new South African administration soon waned. This was evidenced by the change in the position of worker organisation and the taking of VSP's. A positive organisational culture had not been attained but people continued to be suspicious and only trusted those that came from previous administrations they were familiar with.

The period under review was not a time when those working within the department trusted each other and felt comfortable with each other's roles and responsibilities. There was no common understanding of the future of the department and the future of those within the department. This worked against the development of a team that could take the department forward. A clear understanding of what the department has to offer needs to be understood by all that work in it.

By accepting the roles and responsibilities without questioning how these were arrived at would have enhanced the departments ability to build a team. The healthy debate that existed on the appointment of personnel needed to be institutionalised in a manner that related to issues of job descriptions and evaluations.

The divergence that the department had within the appointees should be seen as a reflection of the different strengths and not a reflection of the weaknesses of the different individuals, administrations and organisations from which the department has been welded together.
Lastly employees of the department need to take personal responsibility for their place in the bureaucracy. Self-fulfillment would only be realised when individuals believed and fought for their own space where they would have been able to make a difference.

7.7 Indicators

- Polarised groups reflecting organisational backgrounds
- Stratified groups of employees around historical ideological backgrounds
- A command and control management style
- Lack of a service ethic
- Regionally differentiated training and skills development opportunities
- A culture of maximising differences rather than unification
- The civil service seen as a job rather than service to community
- Little job security
- Many political appointments
- Uninspiring living and working environments
- Unclear and confusing lines of authority and accountability
- Trade unions supporting restructuring initially but later defending members rights
8. CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

8.1 Introductory Comments

Maintaining schooling after 1994 was the first priority for the department of education, and while curriculum changes were of importance, it was only in late 1995 that the directorate for curriculum was given a single staff member. Prior to this, MEC's worked with their Strategic Manager to establish a department. These managers pulled a team together, with subcommittees for budgets, organizational structure, post provincial norms, and maintaining schooling. In the second term of 1995 the department started employing, almost a year after the elections. The previous structures which continued to operate were completely distinct organizations, with little in common.

This section looks at the curriculum change and development process, from the initial standardising focus, through changing curriculum policy, planning and implementation. The poorly conceived structural arrangement and placement of the provincial curriculum function forms the backdrop for fragmented action.

8.2 Standardising the curriculum

The curriculum directorate had to both introduce new curriculum and maintain the old teaching at the same time. The focus of standardizing and integrating the six separate departments focused on the grades 10, 11 and 12, since the province needed to become a matric examining body as a matter of urgency. This was the most immediate need, especially when the DOE's performance was measured substantially by the matric pass rates in the new province. The Annual Report for the DOE in 1996/97 indicates the first common matric examinations were held in this year, marking the end of the six separate DOE's in the province (p3).

New curriculum could not be immediately introduced at these higher levels, as it would have further disrupted the schooling of students who had already had their schooling disrupted by the political transition which had placed the youth at the forefront of resisting the apartheid education system. Curriculum issues prior to 1994 had formed a locus for resistance, and later change in education. Language policy and the forcing of Afrikaans onto African pupils, was a case in point. By starting new curriculum at grade 1 after 1994, a new stream would pass through the schooling system on a single curriculum trajectory.

Curriculum changes did not take place in one easy step. Changes were phased in from 1994, with the first activity being a review of obvious problems in the old curriculum. Areas like history were obviously problematic and offensive, which meant syllabus review had to be rapid in these areas. The history of the Eastern Cape as it was taught under the apartheid regime, was one of battle and victory for European settlers pushing the African population back over first the Fish and then the Kei River. In addition to history, language was another urgent area needing attention, since previously all matriculants had to pass Afrikaans in order to matriculate, despite the fact that most of the provinces' youth saw Afrikaans as the language of apartheid. The rapid cleansing of the curriculum in these areas was a victory for the DOE.
A new national core syllabus was developed by the national education ministry from 1994, with provincial tailoring following (which allowed for 20-30% space for provincialising the content). The Constitutional arrangement over this period was that the national ministry set policy, and the province implemented it. During 1995 and 1996, the province was only trying to standardise education, not really introduce new curriculum as yet. The new curriculum framework came only after 1996, with the early days of Curriculum 2005. Prior to this the national ministry set statements for subjects quite broadly. Only later did discussions on outcomes-based education (OBE) start, and agreements on the 66 outcomes were made (by early 1997). The eight learning areas became policy and programmes for teacher training were developed (by the end of 1997 training started). The changes being developed for the curriculum system during this period were not simply a matter of rewriting history or introducing eleven official languages as subject options, but much more ambitious than that. A totally new approach to education was conceived of, a more progressive and ambitious project known as outcomes-based education. The desire to move away from an oppressive repetitive and mindless form of teaching, to one which encouraged students to think for themselves and respond to the real needs of a society with a large unemployed youth, was the long-term vision driving the new curriculum changes.

8.3 Curriculum policy and planning

The Directorate for curriculum development had been involved in planning extensively, but mostly at a national level, rather than within the province. With only one member of staff for the first few years, collective planning within the directorate was not possible. During this period there was huge pressure on the national department to change, and provincial delegations were sent up to the national level to assist and participate in policy and planning. Provinces were conceived of as almost a department of the national government, and not as an independent sphere as in the final constitution. This was reflected in the policy and planning process for curriculum, which drew provincial directors up to national level for collective planning, as if being called to Head Office.

The provincial government was responsible for the training of teachers, which would logically follow curriculum changes. The curriculum directorate had little attention from province during this 1994, 1995, 1996 period however, with only one staff member in the directorate for the first few years. Respondents working on curriculum during this period feel that it should have been core business of the department. The directorate for curriculum is arguably still understaffed with only 4 people currently employed. Respondents within the directorate feel that this places a question mark over the strategic focus of the department. The strategic focuses of the department during this period seems to have been either what the national ministry was passing down to them (and policy flowed out of Pretoria thick and fast), or whatever presented itself as a serious crisis within the province. This placed the department in a poor position, as it was not so much anticipating changes and engaging with processes so much as being overwhelmed by urgent needs catching them unawares. While this may not be the case within the curriculum section, the day-to-day operations of running the schooling system in the province were demanding more attention from Bisho. The lack of attention to curriculum may have indicated a lack of understanding or attitude to curriculum, which was only reformed in 1997 when broader curriculum philosophy became widely discussed within the DOE.
In 1995 the national ministry for education issued the first White Paper on Education. According to respondents in the curriculum directorate, the curriculum used from 1994 to 1997 does not reflect the new vision created by the White Paper in 1995. This is because the White Paper set up the vision but did not say how it would be implemented. It finally got expression in curriculum 2005, which has since been reviewed. As the director said:

"The scope of learning was being defined in this 1994 - 1997 period, the imperative was to meet the demand of the time, balancing social needs with educational needs. New value systems had to be built, a new social consciousness created, with critical learning. The White Paper set this vision, with the process of review, modernization and adaptation only to follow."

Curriculum was reviewed constantly on an ad hoc basis over this period, not just once a year at a formal planning session. Institutions within the province would make requests for reviews based on daily experiences, for example on subjects to be taught in schools. The curriculum directorate would respond to these issues. This ability to respond shows initiative and flexibility from a directorate with only one staff member, and is commendable. In terms of prioritising subjects for the new curriculum, maths and science were seen as central subjects, as were technology subjects. New subjects were proposed during this period and policy for school subjects and technical colleges discussed. This discussion on subject priorities was important in steering future budgeting and resource allocation. However the ability to carry this through into schools was hampered in the short-term by the underproduction of teachers in priority subjects for the province. Changes to the teacher training system (and especially colleges), were occurring at the same time as curriculum changes were mooted, the relationship between the two being significant.

The production of syllabus statements which set the scene for standardized curriculum, included teachers through regional forums set up to engage with the national policy. Consultation had to be extensive, since there are hundreds of thousands of teachers in the province. The province has a high percentage of youth, and with limited job opportunities especially in the underdeveloped homeland areas, teaching is seen as an attractive career.

8.4 Policy implementation

According to the Director of curriculum, teachers in the regions of the province did implement the new curriculum policy with little difficulty, since changes in subjects like biology and geography were only nominal. Syllabus statements which guided the curriculum standardisation were general and brief, with only adaptation needed from teachers interpreting these. These statements would set the scope of learning within a subject, in a matter of a few lines. This reflects well on the DOE, and the ability of teachers to interpret policy provided to them.

Real changes in the curriculum framework started only from 1997 onwards, with curriculum 2005 causing major upheaval at all levels. There were few obstacles to change in the period 1994 to 1997, as change was not too drastic. Some changes were only a matter of modernizing or updating subjects (for example, changing the subject of typing to use computers instead of typewriters).

In terms of feeding curriculum changes from Bisho out to the schools across the province, staff and teachers out in the field were kept informed of curriculum through
the District Offices (they also had subject officers and EDO's). These staff were the channel for information between DOE and schools. Teams were also set up to train teachers in teacher centres during this period. The three teacher centres were able to utilize resources for implementing new curriculum policy, and reach some teachers within the province. However very little in-service training occurred between 1994 and 1997 outside of the range of the teacher centres. This meant that existing teachers already in the profession had little opportunity to embrace the new curriculum, while it was new potential teachers at the teacher training colleges who were being exposed to the new curriculum more thoroughly.

In service training has only received more attention recently, and new training concepts are only now emerging with district-based in-service training which will eventually be taken down to school level. Schools still need to be capacitated to train internally so that teachers’ service is not interrupted.

8.5 Locating curriculum functions

The structure of the directorates within the DOE as formulated in the first organogram of 1995 was quite confusing, with subject advisers in different sections separate from the curriculum directorate, despite doing the same kind of work. This resulted in potential duplication at worst, and at least inefficiency in terms of co-ordination and communication within functions.

According to the current director of curriculum, there was ignorance within the DOE as to what was in the curriculum in the period 1994 to 1997, and only later did it become ‘fashionable’ to know about curriculum. Directorates needed to be properly aligned during this period, but there was little conceptual clarity as to where curriculum fitted in to the work of the department. The scope of the curriculum directorate’s work was unclear as it was crosscutting. Multiple directorates did the same things, but each in their own way (ABET for example have their own curriculum specialists). Respondents spoke about turfs having been created, and people protecting their kingdoms. Discussions on curriculum 2005 in 1997 seem to have brought the issue to the fore, and given the curriculum directorate some of the attention it deserves.

The observation that directorates were formed with an ill fit to functions of the department was made by a number of respondents. This is a symptom of developing not one, but two organograms during this period which were designed independently of a functional analysis. Function followed form, instead of form following function.

8.6 Indicators

- Curriculum standardized for the province
- A single matric examining body for the province achieved
- Inset teacher development not sufficiently related to new curriculum (for reasons of not being able to locate the teacher development function, and financial constraints)
- Not enough teachers being trained for priority subjects (maths, science, priority subjects)
- Inadequate numbers of subject advisors in these priority subjects
- Training of new teachers in colleges not in line with new curriculum
- Curriculum directorate insufficiently staffed (but better by 1997 with four members)
- Insufficient engaging with national curriculum debates (but by 1997 Bisho engaging more fully with national curriculum framework discussions)
- Curriculum cleansed of odious elements and teachers adapting to new policy
- Insufficient materials development for new curriculum
- Curriculum directorate has settled into its niche, focusing on grades R-9
9. TEACHER DEVELOPMENT

9.1 Introductory comment

At the beginning of 1995 the Teacher Education Directorate was set in place, as reflected in the first organogram of 1995. This directorate did not include in-service training of teachers at the time however. The function of teacher development was at first duplicated between sections, with final responsibility remaining unclear until 1997. Prior to 1997, the directorate of Education Support Services, as well as Teacher Education was expected to carry out teacher development. The directorate has since been restructured to encompass teacher development (the new name of the directorate put in place after 1997, when the second DOE organogram was drafted). The directorate created in 1997 was divided into three sections, namely Adult Basic Education, Technical Schools and Teacher Education.

The first formal organogram of 1995 that was never filled properly, and the two further organograms that have been drafted in the five years proceeding this (1997 and 1999), are an indication of the problems aligning directorates within the DOE, and structuring the department around functions and service delivery. The directorates were first staffed in February 1995. Prior to this teacher development was dealt with by the Strategic Management Team's 'teacher education commission' which drafted a report at the end of 1994 relating to teacher development. The teacher education section set up in 1995 in terms of this report, was made up of seconded staff who were only appointed later in August of 1996, when work on teacher development could start in earnest. This late appointment process impacted negatively on teacher development delivery in this directorate. The teacher development section focused on pre-service training from 1996 (colleges), and only started looking at in-service training in 1997.

This section looks at issues around teacher development policy, the lack of any needs analysis within the sector, and training of teachers (both pre-service and in-service). Finally some indicators are suggested with the benefit of hindsight, that applies to this period.

9.2 Teacher Development Policy

During this 1994 to 1997 period, there was no coherent policy from national level on teacher education. While the White Paper for Education being generated at national level in 1995 set the vision for schools, no policy for teacher education existed at the time. There was a national committee for teacher education which evaluated qualifications and changed norms and standards gradually, developing policy as it went. Issues such as governance and finance of colleges which concerned the province, were neglected by national policy and legislation. The national ministry continued to develop norms and standards for curriculum, while other day-to-day issues like administration, finance and governance were left up to province to manage. As a result of this, disparities between provinces in terms of teacher education systems and activities existed right up to 1999, for example differing fee structures at the teacher education colleges.

The ability of the province to set the policy environment for education generally was limited at the time by the constitutional arrangements of the levels of government.
The province did, however have quite a lot of discretion in receiving national policy on tertiary education between 1994 and 1996. The focus for the province was immediately around teacher training colleges, the province having inherited 21 colleges of education was faced with the task of integrating teacher training colleges from the two former homelands and CPA areas. Little policy and legislation existed to assist this process of creating one college system, and old apartheid legislation was not properly repealed during this period. This made the task for province especially difficult. A draft college’s bill was tabled by the province, but never passed by the provincial legislature. This made the integration of the 6 departments extremely difficult in the absence of a legal context.

The provincial government had not expected to be responsible for teacher training colleges in 1994, and had to rely on the assistance of the national department at times. The final constitution drew tertiary education back to a national competence.

9.3 Needs/skills identification

Little or no formal needs/skills identification exercises were undertaken during this period, and while the Human Resources section checked qualifications of teachers being absorbed into the new DOE in 1995, this was for the purposes of ensuring salaries were properly pegged, rather then responding to teacher development needs in any way. To an outsider it would appear that the process of integrating and changing curriculum would precipitate the need for teacher development in line with new curriculum. Perhaps it was the slow process of changing the curriculum that prevented large scale teacher development exercises, combined with the structural confusion over responsibility for teacher development. The three teacher centers in the province were able to undertake training for teachers in the new curriculum. The annual report for 96/97 noted the re-organisation of teacher education, with the integration of preset and inset achieved by the gradual transfer of Inset during 1996 from the Directorate of Education Support Services to the Teacher Education Directorate. The need for a strong relationship between the development of new teachers, and those who had already been within the system relying on their previous qualifications, was realized in the new structure of 1997 and represents a victory for the DOE.

During the 1994 - 1996 period the needs and priorities of the department were looked at by the Physical Planning Directorate. There were also planning staff based in the regions, but it was only in 1997 that proper strategic planning got started. Before then planning had been accidental, which meant that no formal needs analysis had been suggested. The full extent of teacher development needs analysis, was the identification of priority subjects, which could not be follow-up by any action, as there were insufficient subject advisers in these priority areas. During this period in service training (INSET) was limited to subject advisers and Education Development officers (EDO's), consisting of 80 subject advisers who visited schools and were able to provide limited assistance to teachers out in the field. A moratorium on the employment of EDO's had a similar impact in that teachers out in the field who could not access the teacher centres felt neglected.

9.4 Training

Teacher training and development seems to have focused mostly on pre-service training, ensuring that new teachers entering the system had come through a standardized college education. This lack of focus on existing teachers and
encouraging them to adapt to and change with the new education governing regime, was unfortunate. SADTU complained of little or no teacher development being undertaken in the 1994 to 1997 period, as did Nehawu, the union representing more of the administrative staff at Head Office. Staff development and training appears to have been a problematic area during this period generally.

9.4.1 Pre service training

Pre-service training for teachers, which had been provided by 21 colleges across the province was initially a focus of the department as the process of integrating the colleges run under previous administrations was an urgent priority for the new province. Trying to integrate the 6 separate administrative systems for colleges was difficult, as they were each so different. Systems like procurement and provisioning differed, and took years to standardize because the apartheid legislation which governed these systems was not properly repealed.

Just as the systems for running the colleges were starting to get integrated and the province was making some headway, the proposed rationalization of colleges coming from the national level interrupted this. The incorporation and rationalization processes impacted on each other and caused problems in the Eastern Cape. While colleges were working out how to service a new unified province, the threat of closures diverted the focus away from this task. A national teacher education audit had been done by the national ministry at the end of 1995 and into early 1996. This audit had showed up the general overproduction of teachers in the country, and brought about rationalization as a response to this. The Eastern Cape was not by any means the most problematic province though, although it had overproduction in non-priority subjects the extent of its general overproduction of teacher was limited. It emerged that there was an underproduction in maths, science and commercial course teachers for the province.

In 1996 a phased reduction in student intakes at colleges was introduced in line with the national audit. Meetings held in 1995 showed a skewed intake at colleges in the province, and Bisho developed policy emphasizing priority subjects. However the financial assistance system for all students remained the same, with the same subsidy for each student no matter what areas they were training in. The policy for priority subjects could not therefore, be backed by resource incentives. The percentage of intake for non-priority subjects did reduce nonetheless, representing a significant achievement for the DOE. In 1995 there were 14 500 students in teacher training colleges in the province. This had reduced by 1997 to 11 000.

This reduction in students had another unforeseen impact though. While phased reduction in student intakes proceeded, staff numbers at colleges remained the same, resulting in a higher teacher-student ratio. By the end of 1995 and into 1996 discussions took place between the DOE and college staff about the need to diversify programmes, and respond to real needs. This did not go any further until after 1997, and no major staff changes in colleges occurred in the 94-97 period, staff redeployment not being on the agenda as yet.

The focus within preset training 1994-7 was particularly administrative and geared towards systems restructuring, rather than geared toward changes to the content or teaching material used in the colleges. Again this was a response to the need for teacher education to continue uninterrupted, and the slow progress of curriculum
changes at a policy level stifling the opportunities for changed training methods and content. In 1996 new norms and standards came in as policy in colleges. Up until then there had been a wide disparity in curriculum systems in teacher training colleges. Only in 1996 was uniformity in teacher education brought in. Students on a particular curriculum could not be changed mid-stream, so only from 1998 was the new stream started.

9.4.2 Inset

Teacher training for already qualified teachers was at first duplicated in two sections. In-service training during this period was very limited, with the subject advisory service providing expertise to teachers working in schools as the main teacher development activity. The directorate responsible for subject advisers believed that over 400 subject advisers would needed to be appointed to cover the extent of the province. But in 1996 during the employment process for these new subject advisers, someone questioned the amount of money 400 new advisers would cost. Although the posts had been advertised, the Head of Department stopped the employment process due to financial problems of the department. The directorate was left with 80 inherited subject advisers to work with. Most of these staff were inherited from the Transkei, and qualified in subjects like home economics. This created difficulties as these were not priority subjects. The small group of 80 people had to travel far and wide across the province. There were few or no technical subject advisers, a priority subject are which Bisho had identified. This all created problems as there was no effective teacher support. At the end of 1996 some subject advisers took the VSP, mostly Afrikaners from the western region. The total number then dropped from 80 to 60 subject advisers. Those who were left in the department were said to have nowhere else to go.

The SADTU respondent mentioned that there was a serious shortage of development officers (EDO’s) in the DOE. Their employment had been haphazard and teachers felt that subject advisers were also short. A moratorium on the employment of EDO’s was a result of the financial crisis in 1996 and 1997. The need for field-staff to advise teachers especially in the far-flung rural areas was noted by the union, and it was suggested that results would have improved if this had happened.

This bleak picture of the subject advisory service declining over the period 1994 to 1996, took a turn in 1997, when in-service training joined the new Teacher Development section, creating more clarity on responsibilities and functions. In 1997 there was however a financial crisis within the DOE, which left little money available for teacher development programmes.

In the absence of proper teacher development policy and planning for teachers already qualified and inside the system, what teacher development was available, was often supplied by outside NGO’s, and was attended by teachers showing their own initiative to seek further development. The three teacher centres in the province did valuable work, but had limited reach in a province as large as the Eastern Cape. Some outside respondents reported running courses for teachers and officials in the Eastern Cape in 1995, for example running workshops on the interim syllabus experience in the Western Cape in 1995 and 1996. They noticed there was no coordination with the department (for example regions were not meeting), and no proper syllabus in place. Some people were upset with outsiders coming from the Western Cape with their model, and sharing their interim syllabus experience. These
educationalists noted the lengthy standardising process in the Eastern Cape, and the massive need for teacher support that was not being met at the time. The Western Cape had been advantaged by not having to incorporate any Bantustans.

The second MEC for education admitted that very little teacher development happened in this period, and that some teachers went on their own to improve their skills, for example in maths. "Lots of white teachers took the VSP, and lots of teachers were displaced, sent out by their communities. They had to stay at home, while still being paid by the DOE." Other teachers developed their skills in fields outside of teaching, with a view to leaving the profession.

The Sadtu respondent reported that human resource development in the DOE still needed a lot of work. They felt that the department had no programme in place to change the old thinking and attitudes among teachers. Teachers did not generally become acquainted with the new policy and legislation governing education. In addition the department did not plan for educator programmes with the changes in curriculum. Teachers could not implement policy changes as they were not sufficiently informed. Principles who should have been managers implementing new policies could not, as they had not been taken through the policies. This was especially true for disadvantaged and rural schools.

The large number of schools and teachers dispersed across a province that has limited infrastructure, makes teacher development more difficult. The role that NGO's have played in providing teacher training and policy input has been significant, leaving teacher unions sometimes feeling sidelined.

9.5 Indicators

- No formal needs analysis/skills assessment done as yet
- Inset programmes given insufficient attention within the DoE
- Consequently, inset teacher training insufficiently resourced (with very limited numbers of subject advisers (60), EDO's and three teacher centres)
- Student intakes at colleges reduced - student to teacher ratios too low
- No teacher redeployment implemented yet
- No in-service training within schools
- No teacher development data-base (which lists not only courses, but numbers and locations of teachers going through courses and records of their service period in the DOE)
- It is important that information/data be available to the department
- No career pathing for teachers and incentives for further development within the profession
- Subject prioritisation failing at the implementation stage
- Insufficient retraining of teachers for priority subjects
- Teacher development functions beginning to get consolidated into a newly named directorate
- Teacher training colleges becoming standardized in terms of operations and curriculum for students
10. CONCLUSION

A number of key crosscutting themes run across the eight focus areas around which the chapters have been organized in this report. Some of these reflect negatively on the department’s performance over the period 1994 to 1997, but need to be viewed within their full historical context.

Most visible among these themes is the structural instability of the department brought about by the need to amalgamate six apartheid departments of education, and create a workable organogram that reflected the functions of the new department. Issues of staff hiring and placement within directorates were never resolved to fit the mandate of the department as the organograms reflected form before function. Processes of filling the organograms of 1995 and 1997 were hampered by inherited constraints such as supernumeraries, and incorrect promotions carried out by homeland officials just prior to elections in 1994. In addition union pressure was exerted on the DOE after 1994 to promote absorbed staff into higher positions. This affected the performance of every directorate in one way or another, whether it be due to an upper management structure that was too small, or late filling of posts in understaffed sections, or vastly differing skills levels of staff drawn from the six outgoing departments.

A general lack of management capacity, or capacity to influence the work culture and performance of staff ran across the key functional areas of the DOE in this period. Low staff morale was present across the department, where inherited and newly hired staff had differing ideas on the future of the department and mutual suspicion prevailed. Staff also lacked job security during this period of change and transformation. Given the historically high level of dependence on government for employment in the Eastern Cape, creating an economy of dependence, a fearful and disheartened workforce within the DOE was to be expected. The inherited corrupt and poverty-stricken Bantustans in the Eastern Cape worsened this, as these areas were almost entirely dependent on civil service employment.

The Constitutional arrangement between national and provincial government during this period, which placed province as a kind of department of national government, resulted in policy flowing down from national level with little regard for the provincial implementation context. This was disempowering for the province, and their inability to prioritise policy resulting in ‘policy-overload’ further worsened the position of the province in key decisions around education.

Problematic for all directorates and functions within the DOE was a lack of strategic planning based on sound records or data. Human and physical infrastructure of the new department was not quantified properly, giving little basis for direction of strategic development resources. The apartheid government had ignored the two homelands contained within the Eastern Cape area, preferring not to know the extent of the crisis in education backlogs for these areas. All state data collection exercises prior to 1994 did not include the former Ciskei and Transkei (for example Census, DBSA data). The new DOE was then faced with inherited staff, assets and liabilities that were never declared. It could not get to know itself, and what forging a new department would entail, with any ease.
Another cross cutting theme was that of budgeting and financial problems which effected the head office, regions and schools during this period. Budgeting problems effected every function of the department, and the problems started at the initial stages of drafting a budget based on past expenditure with little departmental participation, through to cash-flow crises when budgets were overdrawn half way through the financial year. Without resources, directorates could not implement programmes and meet priority needs. These overspending and accounting problems need to be viewed in the context of poor communications infrastructure and underdevelopment in a vast, largely rural province, which inherited a decentralized financial system not appropriate for forging a single new DOE.

The lack of a link between budgeting and planning further hampered the DOE’s ability to redirect resources to disadvantaged areas of the province. The national government’s refusal to adopt a funding formula for provinces which took account of the enormous backlogs in a province like the Eastern Cape was a key contributor to the financial crisis in the province. With a classroom-building backlog of 2 billion rand during this period, the budgets given to the DOE were only a drop in the ocean. To date classroom backlogs for the province stand at around 21 259 (ECSECC 2000 report).

In addition the GEAR macroeconomic policy encouraged national government to cut social spending, with education funding suffering as a result. The DOE was also faced with inherited debt from the apartheid departments of education, debts for services such as electricity and water which it had to pay. These outside factors led to a financial crisis largely not of their own making.

The delaying of the transition in terms of concurrently functioning apartheid departments of education, including separate budgets, effected the department to the extent that it lacked unity and equity for the first two years of its life. This needs to be viewed in the context of the need to maintain delivery after the elections of 1994.

A lack of proper or standard human resource management systems and a poor work culture affected all areas of the departments functioning. The absence of job-descriptions and performance management systems made attitudes from some staff impossible to confront, leaving managers in all sections without tools for sound direction of staff. The inherited bureaucracy through which new policies and priorities had to be filtered was not ideally constituted. Some staff created kingdoms and turfs for themselves, which they guarded closely, furthering their own careers rather than the objectives of the department as a whole. The new DOE was a victim of the instability which the transition and transformation of the civil service as a whole created.

Some of the most disappointing areas of the DOE’s functioning were around finance systems, and human resources management systems. Little or no participation in departmental budgeting occurred up to 1997. Accounting irregularities and filing problems persisted within the department, and it was difficult to redirected resources to new programme priorities. The lack of job descriptions, work plans and performance management systems reflected badly on the department. The work culture which developed in the department was impossible to confront. The lack of planning, and especially implementation of planning caused problems for the DOE, as did the imposition of large quantities of policy and legislation flowing from the national level which was not prioritised. Organograms of 1995 and 1997 were not properly filled, although most staff were moved onto the common Persal system.
Confusion over duplication of functions within the department (for example curriculum), was an unfortunate symptom of organograms designed around form rather than function. In-service teacher training was a disappointing area of the departments functioning, with very limited numbers of subject advisers, EDO’s and the three teacher centres working on this area. Subject prioritisation could not be carried through to the implementation stage.

Even in the context of these hampering crosscutting conditions, the DOE made a number of significant achievements during the 1994 to 1997 period. A single consolidated budget was achieved in 1996/1997, heralding the true start of a united DOE. Staff of the DOE were moved onto a single Persal payroll system during this period, bringing about better equity and records for the running of the DOE. The holding of the first common matric examinations with the province as examining body in 1996, marked the creation of a single education system for senior students in the new province: The curriculum of schools had been overhauled rapidly, cleansing it of the offensive material of the apartheid era. Within schools greater accountability was achieved as governing bodies got involved in teacher employment. In the teacher training system colleges were properly standardized in terms of their operations, and student intakes were reduced in line with the overproduction of teachers in the province.

The transformation of the provincial level of government was not a phased transition designed to learn and adjust with the evolution of new departments within their specific contexts. It was rather an attempt at a once-off break with the past, which failed to emerge as rapid and complete in unifying a new province and equalizing the education system based on racially divided access to resources, within the first three years. While ‘the transition in the local level of government was phased as interim, transitional and then final (three phases), this was not the case for provincial administrations. This phased approach would perhaps have been more useful for the DOE to manage and direct its transformation with benchmarks and indicators fitted to preplanned timeframes. Transitional local authorities at local government level allowed for the system for local government to be overhauled based on emerging experience, ready for full expression in legislation flowing from the White Paper on local government to be implement in the final phase beyond the send local government elections in 2000. The provincial administration did not have the benefit of a clearly defined transformation programme, a five-year plan so to speak, with the support of national government and parliament. While issues of civil service performance are of global importance, there is no one solution that fits all. As the ‘Commonwealth Strategies for Reform’ book notes, “success depends as much on an incremental approach to implementing change – a step by step process, within the framework of a clear long-term vision – as it does to a single big push”(1995: 68).

While the provincial Department of Education needs to recognise and take responsibility for its failings, it must be viewed in the context that provincial administrations were expected to undo the legacy of apartheid (including two Bantustans in the Eastern Cape) in one swift movement. In the short period of 3 years which this report reviews, this was simply unrealistic. The lessons which have emerged from the DOE’s experience apply to any government transformation efforts, and are extremely valuable for future restructuring activities.
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